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INVENTORY SECURITY
1. INTRODUCTION
Article 9 has been questioned for its seeming emphasis upon tangible
collateral such as inventory and equipment at the seeming expense of at-
tention devoted to accounts, contract rights, and general intangibles be-
cause of the view that account factoring (in particular) has become much
more important than inventory lending.1 This criticism may be justified
if one compares the dollar volume of account loans to the dollar volume
of inventory loans. On the other hand, the lawyer may not perceive things
through the spectacles of the economist: To the lawyer the litigation
volume in any area may be more significant than the dollar volume of
transactions which have not resulted in litigation. From this latter per-
spective, the inventory lending area is alive and well and living in the
Uniform Commercial Code.
It is the purpose of this article to examine and discuss most of the
important inventory financing cases in accordance with the above outline.
Various non-inventory cases will be discussed in certain areas because of
a lack of inventory cases. This article does not devote any attention to
federal tax liens because of more than adequate coverage elsewhere.2
Inventory consists of goods which:
are held by a person who holds them for sale or lease or to be
furnished under contracts of service or if he has so furnished
them, or if they are raw materials, work in process or materials
used or consumed in a business.'
Under this definition, a car or other hard goods which are leased are de-
fined as inventory4 but it will be shown in a subsequent part of this
article5 that a buyer of this "lease inventory" will not be treated as a
buyer in the ordinary course of business. Inventory held for sale is treated
in one way while inventory held for leasing is treated in another.
Section 9-312 (3) provides that a purchase money security interest in
inventory will have priority over an existing security interest in the same
inventory if the purchase money security interest is perfected at the time
the debtor obtains possession of the inventory and
any secured party whose security interest is known to the holder
of the purchase money security interest or who, prior to the date
of the filing made by the holder of the purchase money security
interest, had filed a financing statement covering the same items
or type of inventory
1. Coogan & Gordon, The Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code Upon Receivables
Financing-Some Answers and Some Unresolved Problems, 76 HAv. L. REV. 1529 (1963).
2. Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda for the Next Decade, 77 Yale L.J. 228,
605, 1104 (1967-68); Coogan, The Effect of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 upon Security
Interests Created under the Uniform Commercial Code, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1369 (1968) ; 1966
Federal Tax Lien Act, 54 CCH 1966 STAND. FED. TAx REP.
3. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-109(4) [hereinafter cited as "U.C.C." or "the Code."]
4. U.C.C. § 9-109, Comment 3.
5. See notes 81-89 infra and accompanying text.
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has received notification before the debtor has received possession of the
inventory covered by the purchase money security interest and the noti-
fication states that the purchase money lender has or expects to acquire
a purchase money security interest in the described inventory. The only
prudent procedure under this sub-section is for the purchase money
security interest lender to file his financing statement and to give the
requisite notice to prior secured parties before the debtor receives posses-
sion of the inventory.' Unfortunately, this simple procedure, which is ade-
quate for the majority of transactions, breaks down in the following illus-
trations:
1. Assume that the debtor is a retailer who sells a bewildering
variety of items supplied by a multitude of manufacturers, wholesalers, or
distributors. If each supplier who claims a purchase money security in-
terest in the particular inventory that he is supplying is very careful in
articulating a very narrow description of "the same items or type of inven-
tory"7 there will not be any real chance of a conflict between the inventory
security interests. However, if any one supplier perfects a security interest
in "inventory," then he may come in conflict with every other subsequent
supplier, and each of these subsequent suppliers then will have to notify
this "greedy" supplier in order to obtain priority over him. Complying
with the quirks of Section 9-312(3) is not difficult even in the event of
broad descriptions in the security agreement and in the financing state-
ment when there are a handful of suppliers. However, when there are
hundreds of greedy suppliers the economic cost of compliance becomes
impossible.
2. Under the literal wording of the code, "any secured party whose
security interest is known to the holder of the purchase money security
interest,"8 even though a secured party never files a financing statement,
he will be entitled to protection against a purchase money lender who has
knowledge of a non-filed security interest. Assume the following hypo-
thetical: A has a properly perfected purchase money security interest in
a dealer's inventory of appliances under a broad "inventory" description
in the security agreement and financing statement. B supplies a new line
of appliances to the dealer under an equally broad description and noti-
fies A in accordance with Section 9-312(3) but fails to record. C supplies
another line of appliances under another broad description and complies
with Section 9-312(3) by notifying A. C fails to notify B because he is
unaware of B's interest. A is protected against B and B is protected against
A, but C has priority over B. This problem may be dismissed with the
thought that since B did not file a financing statement, his loss was self-
induced. But consider the following "wildeyed" hypothetical posed by
6. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 29.3 (1965).
- 7. U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(b) and Comment 3.
8. U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (b) (emphasis added).
[Vol. xxv
INVENTORY SECURITY
Professor Gilmore. 9 A properly perfects a purchase money security in-
terest in widgets of a dealer. A now receives a notice from B that he (B)
has or expects to acquire a purchase money security interest in widgets
of the same dealer. B's "security interest is known to the holder of the
purchase money security interest," i.e., A. Must A abstain from financing
additional widgets for the dealer or must he (A) notify B, who in turn
will notify A and vice versa? Gilmore suggests that the UCC provides
no answer to this notification problem and no solution as to who would
have priority. As Professor Gilmore succinctly puts the case:
Section 9-312(3) sensibly makes no attempt to answer
these wild-eyed hypotheticals. In such a situation, A and B,
once they have become aware of each other's presence, will be
well advised to sit down together and come to an agreement:
the notification mechanism will not solve their problems for
them. If, in defiance of common sense, they engage in a battle of
notifications, they should both be hung. It is not worth anyone's
time to try to figure out the priorities between them. 10
It is all very well to talk about hanging the two lenders, but, in the mean-
time, the dealer will be unable to secure financing if A and B will not sit
down together. In effect, this notification procedure may allow one lender
to monopolize the extending of credit to a debtor.
3. This notification procedure displays a certain ambivalence that
is difficult to reconcile with the rest of Section 9-312. Under Section
9-312(3), a purchase money security interest lender in inventory must
notify other inventory lenders if he has knowledge of their existence even
though they have not filed financing statements. If the same lender should
contemplate lending money on equipment, consumer goods, chattel paper,
or crops he is concerned solely with the possible existence of filed
financing statements. If the lender should learn that the non-inventory
collateral was obtained by the debtor under an unperfected purchase
money security interest with another lender, the second lender has the
perfect legal right to ignore this fact and perfect first. Knowledge of the
existence of a non-perfected purchase money security interest in non-
inventory collateral is irrelevant. The race is to the swift."
9. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 790 (1965).
10. Id.
11. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Atlas Credit Corp., 417 F.2d 1081 [6 UCC REP.
SERv. 12231 (10th Cir. 1969); Bloom v. Hilty, 427 Pa. 463, 234 A.2d 860 [4 UCC REP.
SERV. 821] (1967); In re Smith, 326 F. Supp. i311 [9 UCC REP. SERV. 5491 (D. Minn.
1971); U.C.C. § 9-312, Comment 3. See generally Felsenfeld, Knowledge As A Factor in
Determining Priorities Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 246 (1967).
[Citations to the UCC REPORTING SERVICE have been included where available for.the reader's
convenience].
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II. PERFECTION PROBLEMS
A. Classification
When a supplier of washers and dryers, 2 or a supplier of stoves and
television sets 3 or a supplier of farm machinery 4 sells these items to re-
tail dealers for purposes of sale under purchase money security agree-
ments, it is imperative that the supplier realize that he is dealing with
inventory which requires the filing of a financing statement in order to
perfect the security interest. The fact that these items will eventually be
consumer goods or farm equipment when sold to retail customers may
mislead the supplier into thinking that his interest will be perfected with-
out filing under Sections 9-302 (1) (c) and (d). The mistake will be dis-
covered when the trustee in the bankruptcy of the retail dealer is able to
invalidate the security interest.
B. Description of Inventory
A broad view of the legal effect of the word "inventory" was adopted
by a lower Pennsylvania court in one of the earlier UCC inventory cases.
The final argument of defendant is that "inventory" is too
vague a description and that petitioners' security interest must
be more specific. Section 9-110 expressly states: "For purposes
of this Article any description is sufficient whether or not it is
specific if it reasonably identifies the thing described." The Code
repeatedly refers to security interests in "inventory" and defines
the term as above noted. All goods held for sale come within the
scope of the term and, as applied here, are readily identifiable in
the retail trade. To require enumeration of all types of articles
handled would be unreasonably burdensome and neither within
the letter or the spirit of the Code. Certainly one who sells to a
retailer must be aware of the character of his goods and the dis-
position contemplated by the buyer and that the goods sold
would become inventory as defined in the Code and subject to a
security agreement declaring a security interest in future inven-
tory."'5
This liberal construction was soon followed in two cases which held
that the phrase "motor vehicles" used in a financing statement signed by
a car dealer and a finance company is sufficient as a statement indicating
the type of property covered,'" and the phrase "inventory of merchan-
12. In re McClain, 49 Berks. Co. L.J. 54 [1 UCC REP. SERV. 434] (E.D. Pa. 1956).
13. In re Sam's Furniture & Appliance Stores, Inc., 1 UCC REP. SERV. 422 (W.D. Pa.
1962).
14. In re Shepler, 54 Berks Co. L.J. 110, 58 Lanc. L. Rev. 43 [1 UCC REP. SERV. 431]
(E.D. Pa. 1962).
15. Thomson v. O.M. Scott Credit Corp., 28 Pa. D. & C.2d 85, 91-92 [1 UCC REP.
Sav. 555, 559] (C.P. Chester County 1962).
16. In re Kline, 49 Berks Co. L.J. 56 [1 UCC REP. Sav. 628] (E.D. Pa. 1956).
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dise... in the Kiddy and Women's Wear Shop"'17 is also sufficient descrip-
tion of inventory under Sections 9-110 and 9-203(1)(b).
This liberal approach to the interpretation of descriptions was ex-
tended, perhaps to its outer limits, in In re JCM Cooperative, Inc.'8
where the court held that a description reading "equipment... including
but not limited to . . . all tangible personal property . . . proceeds of
collateral and products of collateral" (emphasis by court) would include
not only equipment, but all inventory and accounts receivable resulting
from the sale of inventory.
In Security Tire & Rubber Inc. v. Hlass'9 the security agreement
and financing statement provided for a security interest in "Company
owned inventory of Stephens Tire Company, 2517 Alma Highway, Van
Buren, Arkansas." 20 The court held that this description was not inade-
quate as a matter of law. It was a question of fact as to whether the
goods could possibly be identified under the agreement. As the court
stated it: "the description need not be such as would enable a stranger to
select the property and that a description is sufficient which will enable
third persons, aided by inquiries which the instrument itself suggests, to
identify the property."' 2'
Security Tire should be compared with In re Mann.22 In the latter
case a financing statement included:
inventory of new pianos, organs, including hi-fidelity equipment
and stereo tape recorders, as well as all other miscellaneous in-
ventory including but not limited to the above items together
with all documents of title representing such collateral as well
as accounts receivable and contract rights now in existence or
hereafter arising or acquired.
23
Unfortunately for the lender, his security agreements (trust receipts)
listed as collateral particular organs and other items of musical equip-
ment describing each item by make, model and serial number. The
debtor (who became a bankrupt) entered into a security agreement
covering the debtor's general inventory with the Small Business Ad-
ministration. The court held that the trust receipts constituted a valid
"lien" in favor of the lender upon the particular items of inventory
which they listed and that the SBA held a lien upon the debtor's inven-
tory other than those items listed in the bank's trust receipts. Between the
two lenders, the bank was first in priority as to the particular items of
17. In re Goodfriend, 2 UCC REP. SERV. 160 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
18. 8 UCC REP. SERV. 247 (W.D. Mich. 1970). But see In re Laminated Veneers, Inc.,
8 UCC REP. SERV. 602 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) which held that the term "equipment" does not
necessarily include the generic term "automobiles."
19. 246 Ark. 1113, 441 S.W.2d 91 [6 UCC REP. SERV. 736] (1969).
20. Id. at 1114,441 S.W.2d at 92 [6 UCC REP. SERv. at 737].
21. Id. at 1117, 441 S.W.2d at 94 [6 UCC REP. SEav. at 739].
22. 318 F. Supp. 32 [8 UCC REP. SERv. 132] (W.D. Va. 1970).
23. Id. at 33 [8 UCC REP. Smwv. at 134].
1971]
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inventory listed while the SBA was first in priority as to the other items
of inventory. The court flatly held that a "financing statement cannot
add collateral not described in the security agreement." 4
A security agreement which describes the collateral as "RCA mer-
chandise" followed by a financing statement which describes the col-
lateral as "RCA Merchandise; Stereos, Radios, Televisions or the like
or any combination thereof . . ." is apparently a sufficient description
of inventory collateral.25 Although the issue was not raised, it would
appear that the description in the financing statement in its itemization
was narrower than the description in the security agreement and this
could cause problems if there were RCA manufactured goods which
would fall outside of the description of stereos, radios and televisions.
A bankruptcy referee has recently held that the following wordy
description in a financing statement is sufficient: "all inventory including
without limitation all commercial and replacement parts and other goods
used or intended to be used in conjunction with any of the foregoing."2 6
Although Section 9-110 of the Code is liberal in the requirement of
description of collateral, there are some limits; hence, a financing state-
ment which covers "cotton waste and proceeds" (cotton waste is a
waste product from cotton mills) could not be deemed to include "cotton
linters" (cotton linters are a by-product in the manufacture of cotton
oil from cotton seed).
2 7
When the security agreement uses the word "premises" in referring
to leases of retail stores, this word cannot include inventory and ac-
counts even though the filed financing statement attempts to embrace
these two items. As a result, the security interest cannot include the
inventory and accounts.28
C. Claiming Proceeds of Inventory
In order to have a properly perfected security interest in proceeds
of inventory, it is necessary that the "proceeds box" in the financing
statement be checked prior to its filing.29 A filed financing statement
which simply states that the secured party was to have a security interest
in all of a tire dealer's inventory and proceeds is sufficient to put all
persons on notice that he is asserting a claim to all accounts receivable
24. Id. at 36 [8 UCC REP. SERV. at 137]. Accord, In re Burkhard, 6 UCC REP. SERV.
244 (S.D. Ohio 1969) (equipment case); In re Schreiber, 7 UCC REP. SERv. 365 (W.D. Wis.
1969) (a farm products case); and Mitchell v. Shepherd Mall State Bank, 324 F.
Supp. 1029 [9 UCC REP. SERY. 165] (W.D. Okla. 1971) (an inventory case).
25. GAC Credit Corp. v. Small Business Administration, 323 F. Supp. 795 [8 UCC REP.
SERV. 952] (W.D. Mo. 1971).
26. In re Bro Cliff, Inc., 8 UCC REP. SERV. 1144 (W.D. Mich. 1971).
27. Annawan Mills, Inc. v. Northeastern Fibers, Inc., 26 Mass. App. Dec. 115 [4 UCC
REP. SERV. 7871 (Mass. App. Div. 1963).
28. In re Weiners' Men's Apparel, Inc., 8 UCC REP. SERv. 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
29. In re Dubman, 5 UCC REP. SERV. 910 (W.D. Mich. 1968); In re Platt, 257 F. Supp.
478 [3 UCC REP. Stag. 7191 (ED. Pa. 1966).
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arising out of the sale of the inventory and to preclude the state-appointed
receiver from asserting a claim to the accounts.80
A security agreement describing collateral to include "customer
accounts" of a business and a financing statement covering "processing
supplies and inventory in trade" and "proceeds of collateral" sufficiently
describes "accounts receivable" of the debtor's business collected by
the debtor and turned over to the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy."'
D. After-Acquired Inventory
One court has held that it is not necessary to claim "future" or
after-acquired inventory in the financing statement in order for the secu-
rity interest to include after-acquired inventory. "No reasonable searcher
of the records would conclude that the secured party had a lien on only
the past accounts and inventory of the debtor, especially where the debtor
is in an active retailing business."2
In a similar vein, it has been held that the words "is] ales and service
of new and used automobiles" 33 in a financing statement were sufficient to
describe the inventory of a car dealer and to put a prudent examiner
upon further inquiry. Furthermore, inasmuch as the debtor was a car
dealer, after-acquired cars were subject to the security interest, even
though the financing statement did not mention after-acquired property
because a car dealer is in the continuing business of buying and selling
new and used cars, and the, addition of the words "sales and service"
30. Matthews v. Arctic Tire, Inc.,__ R.I. -, 262 A.2d 831 [17 UCC REP. SERV. 369]
(1970). The receiver asserted that accounts cannot be proceeds from the sale of inventory,
but the court quickly rejected this argument.
The extent to which courts will strain to find a perfected security interest in proceeds
was demonstrated in the case of In re Mid State Wool Products Co., 323 F. Supp. 853 [9
UCC REP. SERV. 39] (N.D. Ill. 1971). A security agreement which covered the debtor's in-
ventory and accounts failed to cover the proceeds of the sale of the inventory while the
financing statement covered proceeds, but failed to cover accounts. The court lumped the
two documents together to hold that the requirements for perfection of proceeds had been
met under Sections 9-203, 9-204, 9-303, and 9-402 of the U.C.C.
31. In re Gildner, 6 UCC REP. SERV. 973 (W.D. Mich. 1969).
32. In re Platt, 257 F. Supp. 478, 481 [3 UCC REP. SERV. 719, 722] (E.D. Pa. 1966).
Accord, Evans Prod. Co. v. Jorgensen, 245 Ore. 362, 421 P.2d 978 [3 UCC REP. SERV. 1099]
(1966). The same rule applies to cases involving equipment. American Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co. v. National Cash Register Co., 473 P.2d 234 [7 UCC REP. SERV. 1097] (Okla. 1970);
National Cash Register Co. v. Firestone & Co., 346 Mass. 255, 191 N.E.2d 471 [1 UCC REP.
Smv. 460] (1963).
33. Biggins v. Southwest Bank, 322 F. Supp. 62 [8 UCC REP. SaRV. 1319] (S.D. Cal.
1971). A lender may have a valid security interest in after-acquired inventory, even though
neither the financing statement nor the security agreement expressly mentions it when the
subject inventory is to be used in the production of boats because inventory, by its nature
and definition, changes from day to day. In re Fibre Glass Boat Corp., 324 F. Supp. 1054 [9
UCC REP. SERV. 118] (S.D. Fla. 1971). The court was of the opinion that it would strain
the normal meaning of the word, "inventory," to hold that it included only that property
on hand on the date of the security agreement, and that if any of it were used to build
boats, it would be diminished. It must be deemed that the parties contemplated that the
inventory would be sold and replaced.
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indicates even more clearly a continuing financing arrangement, with
a floating lien over the dealer's inventory.
Another court has held that after-acquired inventory was covered
in a security agreement which stated that "inventory of merchandise to
be maintained in an amount not less than $10,000, as per agreement of
sale, at seller's wholesale cost, contained in the Kiddy and Women's
Wear Shop."' 34 The decision would seem to be logical; because in order
to maintain inventory at a fixed level, it is necessary to replace goods
which were sold. The security interest should then embrace the replace-
ment inventory. Although it is not necessary to claim after-acquired
inventory in the financing statement, it is necessary that it be claimed
in the underlying security agreement. 85
E. Policing Inventory
It would seem rather certain that the failure of the inventory finan-
cier to police the inventory will not result in judicial invalidation; the
courts are following the wording of the U.C.C. in this regard.3"
F. There must be a Security Agreement.
Although a filed security agreement covering inventory may meet
the requisites of a financing statement (if it is signed by both parties,
gives the address of the debtor, etc.) 7 a naked financing statement in
its usual statutory form and disclosing no terms of a security agree-
ment may not additionally serve as a security agreement.88 And, of
course, without a written security agreement there cannot be any en-
forcible security interest in inventory goods which are left in the posses-
sion of the debtor.89
As is well known, the Code has established a notice system of
recording and the notice may be such as to require a creditor or poten-
tial creditor to make further inquiry. Perhaps the most extreme example
of this concept was presented in the case of Rooney v. Mason.40 A
husband and wife sold their long established drug store in Cheyenne,
Wyoming to another husband and wife. The sales agreement provided
that if the buyers defaulted on their purchase payments, the sellers could
terminate the buyers' rights under the sale agreement. The buyers did
34. In re Goodfriend, 2 UCC REP. SERv. 160 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
35. In re Taylored Prod., Inc., 5 UCC REP. SRV. 286 (W.D. Mich. 1968) ; In re Platt,
supra note 32.
36. Redisco, Inc. v. United Thrift Stores, Inc., 363 F.2d 11 [3 UCC REP. SERV. 468]
(3d Cir. 1966) ; Grain Merchants of Indiana, Inc. v. Union Bank & Savings Co., 408 F.2d
209 [6 UCC REP. SERV. 1] (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 827 (1969); Phelps v. National
Acceptance Co. of America, 7 UCC REP. SERv. 56 (M.D. Ala. 1969).
37. U.C.C. § 9-402.
38. In re Mann, 318 F. Supp. 32 [8 UCC REP. SERV. 132] (W.D. Va. 1970).
39. U.C.C. §§ 9-203(1) and (2).
40. 394 F.2d 250 [5 UCC REP. SERw. 308] (10th Cir. 1968).
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default and they gave back to the sellers possession of the drug store
with all of its inventory. Two days later, the buyers filed a voluntary
petition in bankruptcy and the trustee brought suit against the sellers
claiming that they had received a voidable preference. At the time of the
sale, the following statement was filed in the proper office for the filing
of financing statements:"'
Notice of Agreement.
Pursuant to the terms and conditions of an Agreement of Sale
dated December 31, 1962, and executed by all the parties
hereto, the undersigned, Thomas F. Mason, and Doris G.
Mason, agree to sell and James R. Johnson and Dolores J.
Johnson, husband and wife agree to purchase, Mason's Air-
base Pharmacy, consisting of the personal property and stock in
trade used in connection therewith.
Dated this 31st day of December 1962.
/s/ Thomas F. Mason
Is/ Doris G. Mason, Sellers
Is/ James B. Johnson
Is/ Dolores J. Johnson, Buyers
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in affirming the district court deci-
sion held that: (1) even though Section 9-402 requires the addresses of
the parties on a financing statement the above "Notice of Agreement"
was a sufficient compliance because creditors in Cheyenne, Wyoming
knew of the business and the home addresses of all of the parties and
had dealt with them; and, (2) in spite of the contentions of the trustee
that this form was defective because it did not state that there was an
underlying security agreement, "[t] he Wyoming courts might reasonably
hold that a creditor examining the records is put on notice to make fur-
ther inquiry upon seeing the notice of agreement."42 As a result, the
sellers' security interest was perfected against the trustee in bankruptcy.
G. Assignment of Security Interest
A security interest may be assigned to another holder without loss
of priority even if no filing of the assignment is made.43
H. Notification of First Inventory Lender by Second Inventory Lender
Under Section 9-312(3) a puchase money security interest lender
who desires to obtain number one priority in inventory goods must notify
any prior inventory lender who had "filed a financing statement covering
41. Id. at 252 [5 UCC REP. SERv. at 310-11].
42. Id. at 253 [5 UCC REP. SEav. at 312].
43. U.C.C. § 9-302(2); French Lumber Co. v. Commercial Realty & Fin. Co., 346
Mass. 716, 195 N.E.2d 507 [2 UCC REP. SEav. 3] (1964) (non-inventory case). Compare In
re Chapin, 6 UCC REP. SEmv. 984 (W.D. Mich. 1969) for the contrary view under Michigan's
variation of Section 9-302 of the U.C.C.
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the: same items or type of inventory" that he (the subsequent lender)
has. or expects to acquire a purchase money interest in this inventory
before the debtor receives possession of the goods. Must this "notifica-
tion" be made by means of some written communication? Sections
1-201(25) and (26) define the concept of notice but give no indication
that the means of giving notice must be in writing, and at least one
court has held that a telephone conversation between two lenders would
meet section 9-312(3)'s requirement." The court further held that this
telephone conversation which discussed the possibility of "furnishing
merchandise or money for merchandise for Alberts [the debtor] to have
additional TV sets and so forth to sell them,"" was a sufficient descrip-
tion of the TV inventory under Sections 9-312 (3)(c) and 9-110.
I. Subordination Agreements
Financing Statements must be in writing to be valid. Security
agreements must also be in writing to be valid unless the lender has
possession of the collateral. Priorities under Sections 9-301 and 9-312
among security interest holders and between security interest holders
and judgment lien creditors are determined by the filing of written finan-
cing statements. However, the question arises as to whether subordi-
nation agreements between holders of security agreements must be in
writing to be valid? Surprisingly, Section 9-316 simply provides that
"nothing in this Article prevents subordination by agreement by any
person entitled to priority" without delimiting that the "agreement" must
be in writing. The word "agreement" itself is not defined in the sense
of whether it may be oral or written," and inasmuch as the Statute of
Frauds Section of the Code47 applies to sales, and the parol evidence
rule48 simply prevents the modification of a written contract by parol
evidence, neither rule requires that subordination agreements (which alter
priorities between security interest holders) must be in writing. As a
result, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma and an Indiana appellate court
have held in non-inventory cases that oral subordination agreements are
valid between secured parties.4 9 It would appear that the same result
should follow in inventory cases.
Although it is not extremely common, it is possible for a secured
lender in inventory to agree (either in the initial security agreement
or in a subsequent agreement) with the debtor that the lendor's security
interest shall be subordinate to a later lender's security interest. The
agreement need not be with the later lender whose rights would be de-
44. GAC Credit Corp. v. Small Business Administration, 323 F. Supp. 795 [8 UCC REP.
S_ v. 9521 (W.D. Mo. 1971).
45. Id. at 798 [8 UCC REP. SERV. at 956].
46. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(3), 1-205, 2-208, and Comment § 1-205.
47. U.C.C. § 2-201.
48. U.C.C. § 2-202.
49. Williams v. First Nat1 Bank & Trust Co., 482 P.2d 595 [8 UCC REP. SEiv. 679]
(Okla. 1971); Hillman's Equip., Inc. v. Central Realty, Inc., 242 N.E.2d 522 [5 UCC REP.
SEav. 1160] (Ind. App. Ct. 1968).
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rived under a third-party beneficiary approach.50 A subordination agree-
ment, if it can be regarded as a release at all, operates only to release
an interest to a third party and is not in any sense a release to the
debtor.5 '
J. Payee Banks Are Not Collecting Banks
Section 9-302(1)(f) provides that a financing statement need not
be filed to be perfected when it deals with "a security interest of a col-
lecting bank (Section 4-208) . .." Section 4-208 refers to an "item"
which in turn is defined by Section 4-104(1) (g) as "any instrument for
the payment of money even though it is not negotiable . . . ." Section
4-208 is designed to cover the situation when a bank is handling an
"item" in the collection process and it has made an advance against the
item. As a result, when a bank is the secured party in two security
agreements covering inventory and accounts as collateral of a debtor
who is now bankrupt, the bank cannot claim that it need not file a
a financing statement in order to perfect its security interests under the
above sections of the Code. "The interest [banker's temporary security
interest] arises in favor of banks in the collection chain; it does not
arise in favor of a bank which holds a security agreement and collects as
payee against the secured note. Such a bank is not a 'collecting bank'
within the purview of § 4-208. " 52
K. Perfection by Possession
Section 9-305 provides that a security interest may be perfected
by the secured party taking possession of the goods, and Comment 2
to this section adds the thought that: "Possession may be by the secured
partly himself or by an agent on his behalf: it is of course clear, however,
that the debtor or a person controlled by him cannot qualify as such
an agent for the secured party." This comment was followed by a recent
case wherein the president of a corporation which manufactured mobile
homes borrowed money from a "family trust" under a security agree-
ment and, as managing agent of the trust, held the manufacturer's cer-
tificate of origin (as provided for under Nebraska law) as collateral for
each advancement of money for each mobile home. The court held that
the president of the debtor company could not act as agent for the
lender-family trust. As a result, the trust did not have legal possession
of the mobile homes and did not have a perfected security interest in
them on the date of bankruptcy of the debtor. 3
50. In re Thorner Mfg. Co., 4 UCC REP. SERV. 595 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
51. Stumbo v. Paul B. Hult Lumber Co., 251 Ore. 20, 444 P.2d 564 [5 UCC REP. SEav.
753] (1968).
52. In re Granite City Cooperative Creamery Assoc., 8 UCC Rae. SEav. 393, 394 (D. Vt.
1970).
53. In re North American Builders, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 1229 [8 UCC REP. Sznv. 1132]
(D. Neb. 1970).
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III. PRIORITY PROBLEMS
A. After-Acquired Inventory vis-a-vis Section 60 of the
Bankruptcy Act (Sections 9-108, 9-204, and 9-303).
Section 9-204 of the Code states that a security agreement may pro-
vide that collateral, whenever acquired, shall secure all obligations
covered by the security agreement. Section 9-108 attempts to articulate
that the security interest in the after-acquired collateral shall be deemed
to be taken for new value and not as security for an antecedent debt if
the debtor acquires the collateral in the ordinary course of business and
the secured party makes an advance which is to be secured in whole or
in part by the after-acquired property. These two sections obviously
authorize the "floating-lien" idea, i.e., that the lien floats on a constantly
changing sea of inventory. Unfortunately, Section 9-204(1) states that a
security interest cannot attach until, among other things, the debtor has
rights in the collateral. Section 9-303 (1) continues this theme by stating
that "a security interest is perfected when it has attached . . . ." These
latter two sections would seem to contradict the first two. When this is
coupled with Section 60(a) (2) of the Bankruptcy Act, it can be argued
that that portion of the floating lien which covers new inventory acquired
by the bankrupt-debtor within four months of his bankruptcy would be
a voidable preference, assuming the other requisites of a voidable prefer-
ence are provable. Under Section 60(a) (2) the transfer of property
"shall be deemed to have been made . . . at the time when it became so
far perfected that no subsequent lien upon such property obtainable by
legal or equitable proceedings on a simple contract could become superior
to the rights of the transferee."54 Federal law refers back to the state law
to determine the rights of the lien creditor on the newly acquired inven-
tory which is acquired within four months of the date of bankruptcy in
order to determine when the "transfer" was made.
The case of Rosenberg v. Rudnick55 would seem to be the post-
Code starting point for reconciling this potential conflict between the
Code and the Bankruptcy Act. Rosenberg used a number of approaches to
reconcile this apparent conflict. First, insofar as the apparent obstacle
presented by Sections 9-303(1) and 9-204(1) is concerned, the court
said:
A first literal reading of these provisions would seem to
support the trustee's contention. However, § 60(a) (2) does not
make the test one of when the state law may denominate a secu-
rity interest as perfected. The specific test of § 60(a) (2) is one
. of when under state law the security interest, however described,
becomes one which cannot be defeated by a subsequent lien ob-
tainable in proceedings on a simple contract action. Perfection
54. 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1970).
55.. 262 F. Supp. 635 [4 UCC REP. SERv. 8] (D. Mass. 1967).
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under state law need not be full perfection but only perfection
so far as is necessary to meet the test of § 60(a) (2). While the
Massachusetts law may not regard a security interest in after-
acquired inventory as fully perfected until it attaches to items
as they are acquired by the debtor, nevertheless § 9-204(3)
recognizes that a lien in such inventory items can be validly
created by a security agreement. Such a lien, after proper com-
pliance with the filing provisions, is superior to a subsequently
acquired contract creditor's lien or other claims of third
parties. ... .6
Second, Section 9-108 would produce the same result in favor of the in-
ventory-secured lender in his claim against after-acquired property even
if (as the trustee argued) no transfer would take place until each specific
item of inventory was acquired by the debtor; under this section it
would be deemed to have been made for new value rather than for an
antecedent debt and would not be a preferential transfer. Third, even
if the definition of Section 9-108 is not accepted, it does show that the
intent of the Code is that such a transfer should not be considered as a
preferential one. Fourth, liens under a security agreement with an after-
acquired clause should not be considered as attaching separately to each
distinct item in the inventory. "In applying § 60, . . . inventory sub-
jected to a security interest should be viewed as a single entity and not
as a mere conglomeration of individual items each subject to a separate
lien.1 57 Fifth, Section 60 was designed to prevent secret liens and the
filing under the Code is the antithesis of a secret lien.
As a factual matter, the court concluded by stating that the trustee
had failed to prove any substantial increase in the amount of the in-
ventory as a result of inventory acquired within the four-month period
immediately preceding the date of bankruptcy. It should be noted that
this latter approach was more in the nature of an "assuming for the
sake of argument" approach then a square holding that the secured
lender would not have any claim over after-acquired inventory which
substantially exceeded the original valuation. Within a few months after
the decision in Rosenberg, the famous case of In re Portland Newspaper
Publishing Co.,58 virtually adopted the entire reasoning in Rosenberg
and applied it to after-acquired accounts receivable. However, Portland
seemed to adopt the dicta in Rosenberg by stating that when the after-
acquired clause embraces the after-acquired accounts, the bankrupt's
estate will not be diminished "because the creditor is only receiving a
substitution of security. There is no preference when new accounts are
substituted for released old ones.1 59 The following year a federal dis-
trict court in Indiana in the case of In re Grain Merchants of Indiana,
56. Id. at 638 [4 UCC REP. Smy. at 12].
57. Id. at 639 [4 UCC REP. SERv. at 13].
58. 271 F. Supp. 395 [4 UCC REP. SmV. 533] (D. Ore. 1967).
59. Id. at 401 [4UCC REP. SEav. at 539].
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Inc.,60 followed Rosenberg and Portland by upholding the account
lender's rights in after-acquired accounts as not being a voidable pref-
erence against the trustee. The court reached this result but expressly
disclaimed any use of Section 9-108 to reach this conclusion. The court
believed that Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act is intended not only
to invalidate secret liens but also to give effect to legitimate forms of
secured financing and that the UCC carries out this intent. It is inter-
esting to note that the court adopted the "single entity" inventory test
of Rosenberg and applied it to accounts.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Grain Merchants
case primarily by paraphrasing the lower court's opinion.61 The appel-
late court also expressly adopted the "single entity" 2 and "substitution
of collateral"6 test of existing and after-acquired accounts receivable,
and used these tests as a means of dispensing with any necessity for the
use of Section 9-108 in the voidable preference area:
However, there is no need to resolve any asserted conflict [be-
tween Section 9-108 and Article 60 of the Bankruptcy Act], for
Section 9-108 is unnecessary to the result reached here. That
Section merely attempts to codify as state law the substitution
of collateral doctrine, which is implicit in the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act, with the additional safeguard that such sub-
stitution arise in the ordinary course of business.64
Less than a month prior to the publication of the seventh circuit's
decision in Grain Merchants, a federal district court in Alabama, 5 in a
case involving claims to after-acquired inventory expressly followed
Rosenberg, Portland and Grain Merchants in upholding the claim of the
inventory lender to after-acquired property as against the claim of the
trustee in bankruptcy. The court then added the flat holding that the
failure of the lender to police the inventory did not invalidate the security
interest.
The same federal district court re-affirmed its holding in a subse-
quent case involving both after-acquired accounts as well as inventory.66
Unfortunately the court invalidated the lender's claim to after-acquired
inventory acquired during the four months prior to bankruptcy because,
although the financing statement claimed after-acquired inventory, the
security agreement did not and the financing statement cannot encom-
pass property unless it is covered in the security agreement. It is inter-
esting to note that the separate security agreement covering accounts
60. 286 F. Supp. 597 [S UCC REP. SERV. 884] (N.D. Ind. 1968).
61. Grain Merchants of Indiana, Inc. v. Union Bank & Savings Co., 408 F.2d 209 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 827 [6 UCC REP. SERV. 11 (1969).
62. Id. at 216 [6 UCC REP. SERV. at 10].
63. Id. at 217-18 [6 UCC REP. SERV. at 11-12].
64. Id. at 218 [6 UCC REP. SERV. at 13-14].
65. Phelps v. National Acceptance Co. of America, 7 UCC REP. SERv. 56 (M.D. Ala.
1969).
66. In re World Wide Perfume, Inc., 7 UCC RuE. SEuv. 616 (M.D. Ala. 1969).
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did claim after-acquired accounts while the inventory agreement did not.
The case of In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., Inc.6 7 reap-
peared in the Court of Appeals for the ninth circuit under the name of
DuBay v. Williams." The court had to deal with the contention of the
trustee in bankruptcy that even though a security agreement is entered
into and a financing statement is filed more than four months preceding
the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, any security interest claimed in
accounts which came into existence within four months of bankruptcy
would fall within the voidable preference rule of Section 60 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act.
The court noted that Section 9-204(2) (d) provides that "the debtor
has no rights in an account until it comes into existence," and that the
trustee asserted that to obtain a right there must be a transfer to the
lender and that this transfer cannot occur until the right arose. Therefore,
it was argued that a transfer occurring within the four months preceding
bankruptcy cannot relate back to the filing of the financing statement
and cannot be perfected before the commencement of the four-month
period.
The court held in favor of the lender, but, in the process, seemed to
reject some (if not all) of the theories (res, entity, etc.) expressed in the
cases previously discussed in this section.
Some ingenious theories have been spun to avoid the result
to which the trustee's logic leads. It is unnecessary for us to
resort to any of them to reject the trustee's argument. The in-
articulated premise is that Congress left to state law the defini-
tion of "transfer" and of "perfection," thereby permitting state
law to control the impact of preferences. The premises is flawed.
Congress itself defined these concepts leaving only some details
to be brushed in by state law.
Section 60a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act provides that "a
transfer of property ... shall be deemed to have been made or
suffered at the time when it became so far perfected that no sub-
sequent lien upon such property obtainable by legal or equitable
proceedings on a simple contract could become superior to the
rights of the transferee."
Congress did not state that a "transfer" occurs when a
security interest attaches or when state law says a conveyance
has been made. Congress provided that a transfer is "deemed"
to have been made when it became "so far perfected" that no
subsequent lien creditor could achieve priority. "Transfer" for
the purpose of section 60a(2) is thus equated with the act by
which priority over later creditors is achieved and not with the
event which attaches the security interest to a specific account.
We look to state law, therefore, only to decide the point at
which Rose City's claim to the future accounts was sufficiently
67. 271 F. Supp. 395 [4 UCC REP. SERV. 5331 (D. Ore. 1967).
68. 417 F.2d 1277 [6 UCC REP. SE v. 885] (9th Cir. 1969).
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asserted to prevent a subsequent lien creditor from achieving
priority over it in those accounts. That time was the date upon
which Rose City filed its financing statement. (Grain Merchants
of Indiana, Inc. v. Union Bank & Savings Co. (7th Cir. 1969)
408 F.2d 209). Because Rose City filed its financing statement
long before the four-month period anteceding bankruptcy, its
security interest is immune from the trustee's preference chal-
lenge.09
After this successful battle of the inventory lender versus the Trustee
in Bankruptcy, it is almost anti-climactic to state that a lender whose
properly perfected security agreement covers after-acquired inventory
has priority over a judgment lien creditor who has levied on the inventory
in the hands of the debtor and is entitled to its return in accordance
with the terms of the agreement and Section 9-503.7o
B. Buyer in Ordinary Course of Business (Sections 9-307 and 2-403)
1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Section 9-307 of the Code provides that a buyer in the ordinary
course of business takes free of a security interest created by his seller
even though the security interest has been perfected and even though
the buyer knows of the existence of the security interest. The buyer in
order to meet the definition of a buyer in the ordinary course of business
must buy in good faith and be without knowledge that his purchase is
forbidden by the terms of a security agreement or in violation of the
ownership rights of another. The buying must be for cash or exchange
or on secured or unsecured credit, but it cannot be for an antecedent
debt.71 Section 9-307(1) has a narrow scope as it is limited primarily
to "inventory" in situations in which the holder of the security interest
has forbidden any sale by the dealer or has placed latent limitations
upon the dealer's apparent authority to sell the goods. If the holder of
the security interest has authorized sales of this inventory without any
strings then this section has no application and Section 9-306 (which is
discussed in the next section) comes into play.
72
Section 9-307 typically applies in cases in which the dealer has sold
inventory "out of trust," i.e., he has failed to pay the inventory financier
69. Id. at 1287-88 [6 UCC REP. SERV. at 897-98]. See also In re King-Porter Co.,
446 F.2d 722 [9 UCC REP. Smtv. 339] (5th Cir. 1971), handed down after this article
initially went to press, which upheld the view that an after-acquired property clause in an
inventory security agreement under Article 9 is not in conflict with the voidable preference
rule of the Bankruptcy Act.
70. William Iselin & Co. v. Burgess & Leigh, Ltd. 276 N.Y.S.2d 659 [3 UCC REP. SERV.
1168] (App. Div. 1967).
71. U.C.C. § 1-201(9).
72. U.C.C. § 9-307, Comment 2. For a classical factual illustration of the application of
Section 9-307 in the automotive trade, see Hamilton County Bank v. Tuten, 250 So.2d 17
(Fla. Ist Dist. 1971).
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with the proceeds of the sale to the buyer. Section 9-307 is designed to
prevent the inventory lender from "hunting with the hounds and running
with the fox" by claiming, on the one hand, that his security interest has
priority over the good faith buyer, and, on the other hand, allowing the
financier to clothe the dealer with apparent authority to sell without
obvious restraint.
In order for a buyer from a merchant to be able to cut off the
security interest of a secured lender in inventory, the buyer must be a
buyer in the ordinary course of business which in turn requires that the
buyer be in good faith and without knowledge that the sale is in violation
of the interests of the secured lender. The 1953 version of Sections 9-307
and 1-201(9) did not require that the buyer be in good faith nor that he
be without knowledge that the sale was in violation of the interests of
the secured lender. The 1953 version stated that: "[A] buyer in ordinary
course takes free of a security interest ... even though the buyer knows
of the terms of the security agreement."7 3 A lower Pennsylvania court
held, under the 1953 version of the code, that when the same individual
was the managing officer of a car dealer whose inventory was subject to
a security interest and also a managing officer of a corporation which
"purchased" the car from the dealer that this corporate purchaser was
not a buyer in the ordinary course of business.74 Of course, the same
result should be reached today under the 1962 version of the Code.
It has been held that a buyer may be a buyer in the ordinary course
of business even though he fails to take possession of the goods (which
are subject to a floor-plan security interest) and leaves the dealer in
possession .
7 5
The very recent case of Sierra Financial Corp. v. Brooks-Farrer
Co. 76 illustrates a very clumsy attempt of an inventory lender to don the
garb of a buyer in the ordinary course of business in order to cut off a
prior perfected inventory security interest. The debtor gave a security
interest in fire-lighters and butane fuel to an inventory lender. The
security interest covered inventory and after-acquired inventory. Subse-
quently, the debtor, being in financial distress, "sold" 17,900 lighters for
$1.00 apiece and 7,000 cans of butane gas for 30 cents apiece to another
company which agreed that the debtor could repurchase the lighters for
their regular sales price of $2.23 or $3.30 each and the fuel for 45 cents
per can. The buyer knew of the existing security interest in the same
inventory. The "buyer" claimed that it was a buyer in the ordinary
course of business, but the court held that the "sale" was not in good
faith and was not in the ordinary course of business of either the debtor
73. U.C.C. §§ 9-307 and 1-201(9) (1953 version).
74. Taylor Motor Rental, Inc. v. Associates Discount Corp., 196 Pa. Super. 182, 173
A.2d 688 [1 UCC REP. SERV. 539] (1961).
75. Levine v. Ficke, New York Law Journal, Dec. 6, 1968, at 17 [5 UCC REP. SERv.
1059] (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nassau County 1968).
76. 15 Cal. App. 3d 698, 93 Cal. Rptr. 422 [8 UCC REP. SERv. 1125] (1971).
'1971]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
or the "buyer." The purpose of the "sale" was to finance the foundering
debtor and to enable the "buyer" to acquire control of the debtor and
another company. "The price at which the goods purportedly were 'sold,'
coupled with the contemporaneous agreement for 'resale' at a price close
to the market price, amply evidences ... that the transaction was a
security transaction expressly excluded . . .,, by the wording of Section
1-201(9) which states that "buying" does "not include a transfer ...
as security for... a money debt."
2. ANTECEDENT DEBT AS CONSIDERATION
Section 1-201(9) in defining a buyer in ordinary course of business
states (in part) that:
Buying may be for cash or by exchange of other property or on
secured or unsecured credit and includes receiving goods or
documents of title under a pre-existing contract for sale but
does not include a transfer in bulk or as security for or in total
or partial satisfaction of a money debt (emphasis added).
There would seem to be little doubt that if the total consideration for a
sale of goods was the satisfaction of a money debt, the buyer would not
be considered to be a buyer in the ordinary course of business. 8 Should
the same rule apply if a portion of the consideration is a satisfaction of a
money debt? A part of this section of the Code was obviously borrowed
from the Uniform Trust Receipts Act 79 and at least two cases under that
act held that a buyer could still be a buyer in the ordinary course of
business even if part of the consideration was the cancellation of a prior
debt. 0 A federal district court has expressly followed these pre-Code
cases and refused to "fractionalize" the transaction by protecting the
buyer as to part of the goods and subordinating him for another portion
of the goods which would be "fractionalized" or apportioned for the
antecedent debt consideration.8'
3. REPOSSESSION OF GOODS AND REVERSION TO INVENTORY STATUS
If the complete facts of Commercial Credit Corp. v. Associates Dis-
count Corp.2 were used as the basis for a law school examination, it
would probably result in the justifiable homicide of the professor. Briefly,
Finance Company A held a purchase money security interest on a car
purchased by White from Dealer Cox; Cox had received the security
77. Id. at 703, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 425 [8 UCC REP. SERV. at 1128].
78. Evans Prod. Co. v. Jorgensen, 245 Ore. 362, 421 P.2d 978 [3 UCC REP. SERv. 1099]
(1966). In accord in a non-inventory case is United States v. Greenwich Mill & Elevator Co.,
291 F. Supp. 609 [5 UCC REP. SERV. 9651 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
79. UNIFORM TRUST RECEIPTS ACT § 1.
80. Colonial Fin. Co. v. De Benigno, 125 Conn. 626, 7 A.2d 841 (1939) and Commercial
Discount Co. v. Mehne, 42 Cal. App. 2d 220, 108 P.2d 735 (1940).
81. General Elec. Credit Corp. v. R.A. Heintz Constr. Co., 302 F. Supp. 958 [6 UCC
RzP. SEav. 1137] (D. Ore. 1969).
82. 246 Ark. 118, 436 S.W.2d 809 [6 UCC REP. Svry. 82] (1969).
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agreement and had indorsed with recourse to Company A. White subse-
quently traded in the car with Cox, and it was sold to a buyer who as-
sumed White's obligations. Later, Finance Company A repossessed the
car from the buyer and stored it with Dealer Cox. Someone forged
White's signature and the signature of Finance Company A's employee
and secured a duplicate title to the car. Then someone forged the sig-
nature of Company A's employee on a release of the security interest.
The duplicate title in its forged condition came into the hands of Finance
Company B which had a "floor plan" arrangement with Dealer Cox. The
car was then sold to Chaney who financed the purchase through Finance
Company B. Still later Finance Companies A and B discovered each
other's security interests in the car. The court held that when Finance
Company A delivered the car to Dealer Cox with leave to sell it, it en-
trusted him with the car under Section 2-403 of the Code thereby giving
Cox the power to convey all rights of Finance Company A to Chaney and,
therefore, Finance Company B as well as Chaney cut off Finance Com-
pany A. Finance Company A asserted that subsection 4 of Section 2-403
which provides that the rights of lien creditors are governed by Article 9
removed subsections 2 and 3 from Section 2-403. The court stated:
Commercial [Finance Company A] contends that the terms
"entrustment" and "entruster" apply only to inventory financ-
ing, and that its rights here as a "lien creditor" were specifically
removed from subsections (2) and (3) of § 85-2-403 by sub-
section (4) which in turn places lien creditors under § 85-9-307.
Commercial then contends that the Chaneys cannot take free
of its lien under § 85-9-307(1) because its lien was not created
by the Chaneys' seller.
We do not agree with Commercial's theory that its rights as
a lien creditor with respect to repossessed property have been
removed from subsection (2) and (3) of §,85-2-403. It clearly
had possession with the right to transfer title without a certifi-
cate of title, and as pointed out by the committee comment, has
no right to complain, whether it be considered as a consignor or
a lender with a security interest, for the very purpose of placing
goods in inventory is to turn them into cash by sale. Therefore,
we think that the entrustment of possession is most applicable
to a repossessing lien holder with right of sale. 83
4. MERCHANT BUYER AS A BUYER IN ORDINARY COURSE OF BUSINESS
Prior to the Code, it was held under the Uniform Trust Receipts
Act that a merchant buying from another merchant could be considered
as a "buyer in the ordinary course of business" so that he would take
free of a security interest-trust receipt-created by the merchant
seller.84
83. Id. at 126, 436 S.W.2d at 813 [6 UCC REP. SERV. at 87].
84. Colonial Fin. Co. v. De Benigno, 125 Conn. 626, 7 A.2d.841 (1939). See 2 G.
GxmoRE, SEcuRrrY IN EESTS 3 PERSONAL PROPERTY § 26.4 (1965).
1971]
UNIVERSITY OF. MIAMI LAW REVIEW
A lower court in Delaware8" has recently held that a car dealer buy-
ing inventory cars from another car dealer may be a buyer in the ordinary
course of business under Sections 9-307 (1), 1-201(9) and 1-201(19). How-
ever, inasmuch as the buyer was a merchant, the court held that not only
must he be in good faith (under the preceding quoted sections) but he must
also comply with Section 2-103 (1) (b) and "observe reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing in the trade." The court noted that Article
2-103(1) provides that "[i]n this Article unless the context otherwise
requires ... (b) 'Good Faith' in the case of a merchant .. ." would by
its wording be limited to use in Article 2; however, "[i] f the standard
of good faith is to have meaning in Article 9 with regard to merchants,
it should not vary with that applied to merchants under Article 2 " '86
Therefore, it is a question of fact as to whether the merchant buyer in
the auto business acted in a commercially reasonable manner. If the ques-
tion is answered in the affirmative, then the merchant buyer in the ordi-
nary course of business can cut off the floor plan financier of the mer-
chant vendor. This result can be devastating because although the
floor plan lender may be willing and able to absorb the loss when a
"retail" buyer in the ordinary course of business buys one car and cuts
off the security interest, the loss ceases to be bearable when the buyer
buys a number of cars on the "wholesale" level.
A recent New York case87 presents another facet of this "wholesale"
buyer in the ordinary course of business concept. A wholesale used car
dealer purchased 13 used cars from a car leasing business. The car leasing
business purchased its lease cars subject to a purchase money security
interest, which provided that the debtor was not to sell the cars and that
an attempt to sell would result in a default. A financing statement was
filed with the proper county clerk under New York law, but it contained
no statement dealing with the question of sale. The "proceeds box" was
checked in the financing statement. The wholesale buyer did not check
for any filing of financing statements and claimed it was a buyer in
ordinary course of business. The court held that: First, since the buyer
was a merchant it had to meet the double definition of good faith set
forth in Sections 1-201(19) and 2-103 (1.)(b)-the court made no men-
tion of the fact that Section 2-103 refers to "this article" which might
be meant to confine it to Article 2 rather than allowing it to come into
Article 9 as held by the Delaware court. Second, there was no obligation
incumbent upon the wholesale buyer to check the records for a financing
statement even though he was a dealer with supposed expertise in the
85. Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp., 269 A.2d 407 [8 UCC Rep. Serv. 123] (Del.
Super. Ct. 1970).
86. Id. at 409 [8 UCC Rnp. SERv. at 126-27). In a subsequent opinion the court held
that it was a departure from custom in the trade for the buyer to leave the purchased cars
in the possession of the dealer-seller. The retention of possession misled the floor plan lender
hence the buyer was not a buyer in ordinary course of business. Sherrock v. Commercial
Credit Corp., 277 A.2d 708 [9 UCC REP. SmRv. 294) (Del. Super. Ct. 1971).
87. Hempstead Bank v. Andy's Car Rental System, Inc., 35 App. Div. 2d 33, 312
N.Y.S.2d 317 [7 UCC RrP. SERv. 9321 (1970).
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automotive trade; this buyer was not to be charged with bad faith for
failing to check. And even if it had checked, the financing statement
would not have disclosed the restriction on sale imposed in the security
agreement. Third, even though the cars in question were classifiable as
inventory under Section 9-109(4), that section is not the true test of
applying the buyer in ordinary course of business rule under Sections
9-307 and 1-201 (9). The true test is whether the car leasing business was
"in the business of selling goods of that kind." '88 Since the car leasing
business was not in the business of selling cars, then a buyer from it
could not be, as a matter of law, a buyer in the ordinary course of busi-
ness. Fourth, aside from Section 9-307, Section 9-306(2) provides that
a security interest in collateral may be lost if the debtor's sale "was
authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise" 9
and the claim to proceeds in the financing statement might be construed
as impliedly authorizing the sale. A jury question is presented as to
whether there was an implied authorization to sell. It is interesting to
note that the court seemingly assumed without discussion that the whole-
sale buyer in this case could be a buyer in the ordinary course of business.
The Supreme Court of Texas has also held that the purchase by an
auto dealer from another dealer of a new, unregistered motor vehicle
which is subject to a security interest created by the seller comes within
Section 9-307(1),1° and similar views have been expressed by lower
courts in Georgia 9' and Pennsylvania. 2 The Supreme Court of Oklahoma
has held that a car dealer who purchases a used car from another used
car dealer may be a buyer in the ordinary course of business under
Section 2-403 of the Code.9
Although a car dealer may be a buyer in the ordinary course of
business when he purchases from another car dealer, it has been held
that when the sale takes place on the auction lot of a third party located
in a state in which neither buyer nor seller was doing business this was
not in the ordinary course of business. 4
5. CAN A LESSEE BE A BUYER?
A lease of chattels is not required to be filed under the UCC,95 and
a floor plan lender for cars takes subject to the rights of a lessee of a car
88. Id. at 39, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 321 [7 UCC REP. SERV. at 9361.
89. Id. at 39, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 321 [7 UCC REP. SERV. at 9361 (emphasis in original).
90. Associates Discount Corp. v. Rattan Chevrolet, Inc., 462 S.W.2d 562 [8 UCC REP.
SERv. 117] (Tex. 1970).
91. Dunford v. Columbus Auto Auction, Inc., 114 Ga. App. 407, 151 S.E.2d 464 [3 UCC
REP. SERv. 8431 (1966).
92. Select Motors, Inc. v. Kemp, 42 Pa. D. & C.2d 603 [4 UCC REP. SERV. 720) (Pa.
Ct. C.P., Wash. County 1967).
93. Medico Leasing Co. v. Smith, 457 P.2d 548 [6 UCC REP. SERV. 786] (Okla. 1969).
94. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Leo's Used Car Exch., Inc., 314 F. Supp 254 [8
UCC REP. SaEV. 93] (D. Mass. 1970).
95. First Nat1 Bank & Trust Co. v. Smithloff, 119 Ga. App. 284, 167 S.E.2d 190 [6
UCC REP. Siav. 400] (1969).
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who is in possession of it. Further, it may be a question of fact as to
whether a lessee of a car may be treated as a buyer in the ordinary course
of business with the power to cut off a security interest perfected prior
to the lease of the car.
96
6. MUST THE SELLER CREATE THE SECURITY INTEREST?
It must be remembered that Section 9-307(1) provides that a buyer
in the ordinary course of business "takes free of a security interest cre-
ated by his seller," and it is easy to overlook the italicized words and
misapply the section. A recent case from the Supreme Court of Ne-
braska 7 seems to illustrate this point. The court stated as dicta that if
the Code were applicable to a case involving a sale of machinery by a
dealer on conditional sale to a company and then the dealer assigned the
conditional sale contract to a bank and then later the buyer returned the
machinery to the dealer for repair and the dealer sold it to another buyer,
this second buyer would be a buyer in the ordinary course of business
who cuts off the original security interest. The court seemingly overlooked
the fact that the security interest was not created by the seller-dealer; it
was created by the first buyer. Fortunately, the court decided the case on
pre-Code law and the apparent mistake did not affect the outcome of
this case; it might, however, adversely affect the outcome of others.98
Some fancy footwork by a clever auto dealer confronted the Iowa
Supreme Court in General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Keil 9 A retail
franchised auto dealer had possession of a new Pontiac under a manufac-
turer's certificate of origin which showed that the manufacturer had
transferred title to the dealer. Subsequently, the dealer assigned the
certificate of origin to itself and applied for a certificate of title. The cer-
tificate of title was issued to the dealer. Later the president of the
dealer and the dealer company entered into a conditional sales contract
for the car and the contract was assigned to G.M.A.C. The lien of
G.M.A.C. was shown on the title certificate, but the title certificate never
showed the title of the "president-buyer" of the car. Subsequently,
Taylor purchased the car which was in the showroom of the dealer and
gave a check to the dealer. Taylor did not know of the prior dealings
involving this car, and he never received a certificate of title for it. Of
course, the payments were not made to G.M.A.C. on the conditional sales
contract and G.M.A.C. brought replevin for the car against Taylor, the
buyer. Taylor asserted that he was a buyer in the ordinary course of
business out of inventory and should prevail over G.M.A.C. under Section
96. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. McElmurray, 120 Ga. App. 134, 169 S.E.2d 720 (6
UCC REP. SERV. 8471 (1969). Compare with the Smithloff case in note 95 supra.
97. General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Western Crane & Rigging Co., 184 Neb. 212, 166
N.W.2d 409 [6 UCC REP. SERV. 67] (1969).
98. See Muir v. Jefferson Credit Corp., 108 N.J. Super. 432, 262 A.2d 33 [7 UCC REP.
Stav. 273] (Essex County 1970) for a correct analysis of 9-307(1).
99. -. Iowa -... , 176 N.W.2d 837 [7 UCC REP. SERv. 835] (1970).
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9-307(1) which provides that a buyer in the ordinary course of business
"takes free of a security interest created by his seller . . . ." The difficult
point was, of course, that the seller in this case did not create the security
interest-it was created by the president who purportedly purchased the
car from the corporate dealer. The Iowa court summarily brushed this
argument aside:
The title rested in Pemberton and Keil, Inc., [the dealer] and
was regular on its face. The application for the notation Of the
lien to appellant was made by the president of the corporate
titleholder. The automobile was purchased from the showroom
of the corporate titleholder. We see no reason why the purchaser
of an automobile should not be afforded the same protection as
the purchaser of other property out of inventory, and we refuse
to hold that the Legislature, which obviously intended broad
protection to the consumer by enactment of section 554.9307 (1)
[9-307] would anticipate the giving of preference to a lien be-
cause its creator was not as shown on the records, but another
party under a confidential transaction of which the ultimate
purchaser had no knowledge. 00
7. LENDER'S RETENTION OF CAR TITLES DOES NOT DEFEAT
THE OPERATION OF 9-307
It seems to be a common practice for floor plan lenders of used car
dealers to keep possession of the title certificates for the car dealer's
inventory and to release them to the dealer only upon his payment of a
loan or by complying with some other releasing procedure. It would ap-
pear that this procedure affords little protection to the lender even in a
state which has a rather strict car title statute because Section 9-307(1)
comes into play to protect the buyer in the ordinary course. 01
8. A VENDOR OF FRANCHISES UNDER 9-307(1)
The buyer in the ordinary course notion received an interesting
application in McFadden v. Mercantile Sale Deposit & Trust Co."2
which held that a man who purchases two "Mister Softee" ice cream
trucks and a franchise from the franchisor may be a buyer in the ordinary
course of business and thereby cut off the properly perfected security
interest which was filed against these trucks sold by the franchisor.
9. INVENTORY FINANCIER VERSUS AUCTIONEER
An auctioneer who sells automobiles which are subject to a floor
plan security interest and applies the proceeds in payment of a pre-
100. Id. at -. , 176 N.W.2d at 841 [7 UCC REP. SERv. at 8411.
101. Correria v. Orlando Bank & Trust Co., 235 So.2d 20 [7 UCC REP. Sanv. 937] (Fla.
4th Dist. 1970). Compare with Interstate Sec. Co. v. Hamrick's Auto Sales, Inc.,238 So.2d
482 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1970) ; see text accompanying note 108 infra.
102. 7 UCC REP. SERv. 562 (Super. Ct. Baltimore, Md. 1969).
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existing debt owed to the auctioneer by a used car dealer-debtor is not a
"buyer" under Section 9-307 of the Code. Since he has been paid for an
antecedent debt he cannot be a "buyer in ordinary course of business"
even if he were a "buyer." Further, the auctioneer would be liable to the
floor plan financier in trover under a conversion theory for conducting
the sale of the cars even if he had turned over the proceeds of the sale
to the car dealer, and this liability would be even more certain when the
auctioneer keeps the proceeds to pay an antecedent debt.1"3 In a similar
vein, another court has held that an auctioneer in conducting an auction
sale is an agent and cannot be considered a seller or buyer."°4
10. AUTO DEALER SURETY BONDS
North Dakota requires that an applicant for a motor vehicle dealer's
license furnish a surety bond in the amount of $10,000
indemnifying any person dealing or transacting business with
said dealer in connection with any motor vehicle from any loss
or damage occasioned by the failure of such dealer to comply
with any of the provisions of title 39, including, but not limited
to, the furnishing of a proper and valid certificate of title to the
motor vehicle involved in any such transaction .... 105
North Dakota gives its statutes a liberal construction, and it has been
held that this statute is broad enough to protect a floor plan lender who
has been ordered by a court to deliver certificates of title to buyers in the
ordinary course of business from a car dealer who sold the cars and did
not turn over the proceeds to the inventory lender. The court held that
Section 9-307(1) protects the buyers in the ordinary course against the
lender and there would be little need for this statute if its remedy were
limited to purchasers who are already protected. 06
Florida also requires that applicants for annual licenses as motor
vehicle dealers post a surety bond (in the amount of $5,000) in "favor of
any person who shall suffer any loss as a result of any violation of the con-
ditions""0 dealing with the sale or exchange of motor vehicles under
103. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Joplin Auto. Auction Co., 430 S.W.2d 440 [5 UCC
REP. SERV. 899] (Mo. Ct. App. 1968). Compare Greater Louisville Auto Auction, Inc. v.
Ogle Buick, Inc., 382 S.W.2d 17 [2 UCC REP. SERV. 344] (Ky. Ct. App. 1965) which held
that upaid vendors could enforce their equitable liens against an auctioneer who had some
knowledge of the desperate financial straits of the person who delivered cars to the auction-
eers for sale. See also United States v. Big Z Warehouse, 311 F. Supp. 283 [7 UCC REP. SERV.
1061] (S.D. Ga. 1970); Clovis Nat'l Bank v. Thomas, 77 N.M. 554, 425 P.2d 726 [4 UCC
REP. SERV. 137] (1967). See generally Annotation, 96 A.L.R.2d 208 (1964).
104. Tulsa Auto Dealers Auction v. North Side State Bank, 37 Okla. Bar Ass'n J. 2493,
[3 UCC REP. SERV. 1041] (Okla. 1966).
105. -N9RTH DAKOTA COMMERCIAL CODE § 39-22-05 (Supp. 1971).
.106. State ex rel. First American Bank & Trust Co. v. General Ins. Co. of America, 179
N.W.2d 123[8 UCC REP. SERV. 127] (N.D. 1970).
i07. FLA. STAT. § 320.27(10) (1969).
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Chapters 319 and 320 of the Florida Statutes. In a recent case,108 a dealer
"floor planned" three cars for $4,856. The dealer retained possession of
the cars, and gave the lender the original certificates of title for the cars.
The dealer obtained duplicate certificates of title, sold the three cars and
failed to pay the floor plan lender. The lender sued the dealer and ob-
tained a worthless judgment. The court held that the bonding statute is
designed to protect the general buying public buying cars in this state,
but that this protection is not the statute's sole purpose. The facts estab-
lished that the dealer falsely represented that the original title certificates
had been lost or destroyed in order to secure duplicate certificates which
constitutes a violation of Section 319.29 of the Florida Statutes. This
violation is a breach of the bond required by the Florida law which fur-
ther provides that the bond is in "favor of any person who shall suffer
any loss" and this would include the floor plan lender.
11. EXTENSIONS OF THE CONCEPT
The normal operation of Section 9-307(1) is to protect a buyer of
goods in the ordinary course of business from a security interest created
by the dealer before the sale to a buyer. However, this Code section has
been extended in Florida 0 9 and Pennsylvania'" to protect a buyer who
purchases and takes possession of a motor vehicle as against a floor plan
lender who has taken a security interest after the sale to the buyer when
the dealer has retained the title certificate for the supposed purpose of
obtaining a new title certificate in favor of the new buyer.
Section 2-403 can also come into play in questions involving the
supplying of inventory. For example, in Humphrey Cadillac & Olds-
mobile Co. v. Sinard,"' a car dealer had been selling cars for years to a
second car dealer. The wholesale and truck sales manager of the first
dealer was instructed not to sell any more cars to the second dealer be-
cause of difficulties in securing payment. For some reason, the sales
manager sold two Cadillacs to the second dealer who in turn sold them
to two customers. These customers did not receive their car titles, and
after numerous telephone conversations with the sales manager of the
first dealer they were reassured that they would receive the titles in due
course. The second dealer failed to pay the first dealer and the first dealer
brought replevin against the two buyers. The court held that the sales
manager had acted within the apparent scope of his authority in selling
the cars to the second dealer; that the buyers from this second dealer
108. Interstate Sec. Co. v. Hamrick's Auto Sales, Inc., 238 So.2d 482 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
109. Stroman v. Orlando Bank & Trust Co., 239 So.2d 621 [8 UCC REP. SERV. 395]
(Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
110. Weisel _v. McBride, 191 Pa. Super. 411, 156 A.2d 613 [1 UCC REP. SEv. 5501
(1959).
111. 85 IM. App. 2d 64, 229 N.E.2d 365 [4 UCC REP. SEV. 640] (1st Dist. 1967).
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were buyers in the ordinary course of business; and, that the buyers were
entitled to the cars as against the first dealer.
12. AIRCRAFT INVENTORY SECURITY INTERESTS
Section 9-104(a) of the UCC provides that Article 9 does not apply
"to a security interest subject to any statute of the United States such as
the Ship Mortgage Act, 1920, to the extent that such statute governs the
rights of parties to and third parties affected by transactions in particular
types of property." (emphasis added) Comment 1 to this section is
particularly enlightening:
Where a federal statute regulates the incidents of security
interests in particular types of property, those security interests
are of course governed by the federal statute and excluded from
this Article. The Ship Mortgage Act, 1920, is an example of
such a federal act. Legislation covering aircraft financing has
been proposed to the Congress, and, if enacted, would displace
this Article in that field. The present provisions of the Civil
Aeronautics Act (49 U.S.C.A. § 523) call for registration of
title to and liens upon aircraft with the Civil Aeronautics Ad-
ministrator and such registration is recognized as equivalent
to filing under this Article (Section 9-302(3)) ; but to the extent
that the Civil Aeronautics Act does not regulate the rights of
parties to and third parties affected by such transactions, se-
curity interests in aircraft remain subject to this Article, pend-
ing passage of federal legislation.
Section 503 of the 1958 Federal Aviation Act" 2 provides for a
central system of recording conveyances, mortgages, etc. for aircraft and
states that no conveyance, mortgage, etc. shall be valid until it is recorded.
Section 506 of the Act was added in 1964,11 and provides that
the validity of any instrument the recording of which is pro-
vided for by section 1403 of this title shall be governed by the
laws of the State . . . in which such instrument is delivered,
irrespective of the location or the place of delivery of the prop-
erty which is the subject of such instrument.
It is submitted that although the federal government could take exclusive
jurisdiction over the substantive law dealing with titles to and security
interest priorities in aircraft, it has not done so. In brief, Section 503
says that no conveyance, mortgage, etc. shall be "valid" until it is filed,
but the section does not expressly state what the effects of filing will be
and then the law itself states that the "validity" is measured by state
not federal law." 4 Unfortunately, the case law is confused on the question
112. 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1970).
113. 49 U.S.C. § A406 (1970).
114. State Sec. Co. v. Aviation Enterprises, Inc., 355 F.2d 225 (10th Cir. 1966). See ex-
tensive Editor's note in 4 UCC Ru. Snv. 439 (1968).
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of whether a buyer of an aircraft in the ordinary course of business from
an aircraft dealer takes free of a security interest created by the dealer.
The California Supreme Court," 5 in reversing a scholarly decision of the
California District Court of Appeal,"' has held that the federal act has
preempted the field and Section 9-307 of the UCC has no application.
A buyer of an aircraft in California from a dealer must check with the
Federal Aviation Authority before purchasing or take subject to a floor
plan security interest. A federal district court in Michigan," 7 a lower
Ohio court," 8 and a federal district court in Arkansas" 9 dealing with
a pre-Code floor plan have held, contrary to the California Supreme
Court, that a buyer in the ordinary course of business does take free of
a filed floor plan security interest in aircraft. On the other hand two
lower California courts 20 and a lower court in New Jersey' 2 ' have held
(in factually different cases) that federal law has preempted the field
and the UCC has no application.
It should be noted that the Supreme Court of Oregon has recently
held 22 that where the Ship Mortgage Act does not govern the rights of
the parties either because the vessel in question is not a federally docu-
mented vessel or because the formalities of the Act have not been complied
with fully, Article 9 does. govern the rights of the parties. It is submitted
that a similar approach should be followed in dealing with security in-
terests in aircraft.'
23
13. BONA FIDE BUYERS OUT OF THE ORDINARY COURSE
It should be noted that if the inventory lender should fail to properly
perfect his security interest by filing a financing statement, it is possible
for a bona fide purchaser buying the inventory out of the ordinary course
of business for a valuable consideration and having neither actual nor
115. Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., Inc., 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1
[8 UCC REP. SEmv. 274] (Sup. Ct. 1970).
116. Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., Inc., 4 Cal. App. 3d 748, 84 Cal. Rptr. 654 [7
UCC REP. SEarv. 545] (1970).
117. Northern Illinois Corp. v. Bishop Distrib. Co., 284 F. Supp. 121 [5 UCC REP. SERV.
84] (W.D. Mich. 1968).
118. Suburban Trust & Say. Bank v. Campbell, 19 Ohio Misc. 74, 48 Ohio Op. 2d 250,
250 N.E.2d 118 [6 UCC REP. SERV. 964] (1969).
119. Texas Nat'l Bank v. Aufderheide, 235 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. Ark. 1964).
120. International Atlas Serv., Inc. v. Twentieth Cen. Aircraft Co., 251 Cal. App. 2d 434,
59 Cal. Rptr. 495 [4 UCC REP. SERV. 439] (1967) ; cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1038 (1968) ; Pope
v. National Aero Fin. Co., 236 Cal. App. 2d 722, 46 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1965).
121. Smith v. Eastern Airmotive Corp., 99 N.J. Super. 340, 240 A.2d 17 [4 UCC REP.
SERv. 1117] (Ch. Div., Bergen County 1968).
122. Security Bank of Oregon v. Levens, - Ore. -, 480 P.2d 706 [8 UCC REP. SERV.
977] (1971). Compare with Corkle v. First Pennsylvania Banking & Trust Co., 321 F. Supp.
149 [8 UCC REP. S iv. 981] (D. Md. 1970).
123. See 1 G. GiLmoan, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 13.5 and 19.9
(1965).
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constructive knowledge of the security interest to take free of the
interest.'24
14. 9-307(1) COMPARED WITH 9-307(2)
Any prudent lender in a purchase money inventory arrangement will
insist that he be given a security interest in the proceeds arising from the
sale of the inventory, and the security agreement and financing statement
should provide for this interest.125 The proceeds from the sale of this
inventory, especially at the retail level, will often consist of chattel paper
(a security agreement and promissory note) given by the consumer to
the dealer who in turn will assign the paper to the inventory lender. For
example, the retailer sells an electric stove to a retail buyer for the buyer's
own use as "consumer goods." The stove is subject to a security interest
as inventory goods, but, of course, the retail buyer (buyer in the ordinary
course of business) takes free of this perfected security interest under
Section 9-307(1).126 Often, the retail vendor will not file a financing
statement covering this sale of the stove, but, under Section 9-302 (1) (d),
this purchase money security interest is perfected without filing. However,
if the consumer-buyer should sell the stove to an individual for "personal,
family or household use," the "perfected" security interest would be cut
off under Section 9-307 (2). In the event of bankruptcy of the retail store,
this would result in a complete loss to the inventory financier because
there would not be any security interest in the stove and no claim against
the "second" consumer buyer.
If the first consumer buyer in our example should sell this stove to a
merchant who in turn sells it to another individual for his personal use
would the same result follow? Fortunately for the original inventory
financier and unfortunately for the second buyer, the answer would be no.
Subsection (2) of Section 9-307 provides that "in the case of consumer
goods" a buyer takes free of an unfiled security interest if he buys "with-
out knowledge of the security interest, for value and for his own per-
sonal, family or household purposes." It can be argued that the italicized
words "in the case of consumer goods" imply that a buyer must buy the
goods from a consumer because only as long as the goods remain in a
consumer's hands will they meet the description of consumer goods-in
short a consumer must buy from a consumer and not from a merchant
because in the latter case the goods become "inventory" rather than
"consumer goods." This latter approach has been taken by the courts in
Massachusetts127 and apparently by the Supreme Court of New Hamp-
124. Dunford v. Columbus Auto Auction, Inc., 114 Ga. App. 407, 151 S.E.2d 464 J3
UCC REP. SERV. 843] (1966).
125. U.C.C. § 9-306(3) (a).
126. See Franklin Inv. Co. v. Homburg, 252 A.2d 95 [6 UCC REP. SERv. 60] (D.C. Ct.
App. 1969).
127. National Shawniut Bank v. Vera, 352 Mass. 1, 223 N.E.2d 515 [4 UCC REP. SERV.
1] (1967); New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Auto Owners Fin. Co., 355 Mass. 487,
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shire. 1 2 The original lender may sue the purchasing merchant for con-
version.1 29
Of course, the whole problem can be obviated by the proper filing of
a financing statement which prevents any consumer from cutting off the
security interest.180
15. "NON-PROFESSIONAL SUPPLIERS OF INVENTORY" VERSUS
BUYERS IN ORDINARY COURSE OF BUSINESS
It is a relatively common practice for car owners to deliver their
used cars to used car dealers under an agreement whereby the dealers
sell the cars as agents for the owners and then remit an agreed amount
to the owners. The dealers have the advantage of not having their capital
tied up in the cars and with the right to return the cars if they do not
sell at the prices set by the owners-in short the individual owners are
financing the used car dealers' inventories. Unfortunately, the individual
car owners may not have equal advantages if the dealers should sell the
cars and abscond with the proceeds. It has been held in Oklahoma'1'
and Nevada 32 that when an owner entrusts his car to a used car dealer
who sells the car to a buyer in the ordinary course of business, the buyer
obtains valid title under Section 2-403 even though the buyer does not
receive the certificate of title which was held by the entrusting owner.
It is interesting to note that Oklahoma law provides that a car title is
not a muniment of title while Nevada generally requires strict compliance
with its certificate of title laws, but that both states give full effect to
Section 2-403 in an effort to protect the buyer in the ordinary course of
business at the expense of the owner. It is further worthy of note that the
car owner in the Nevada case was a layman while the owner in the
Oklahoma case was a car leasing agency and the buyer (from the used
car dealer) was also a car dealer-different facts but similar results.
C. Inventory Lender's Interest in Proceeds
1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Section 9-307 of the Code is designed to help the buyer in the ordi-
nary course of business at the expense of the financier of the inventory-
goods. Section 9-306 is the other side of the coin designed to give some
245 N.E.2d 437 [6 UCC REP. SERV. 58] (1969); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Toville,
6 UCC REP. SERv. 409 (Mass. App. Div. 1969).
128. Everett Nat'l Bank v. Deschuiteneer, 109 N.H. 112, 244 A.2d 196 [5 UCC REP.
SERv. 561] (1968).
129. Mahaley v. Colonial Trading Co., 6 UCC RPj,. SERv. 746 (Pa. Ct. C.P., York County
1969).
130. U.C.C. § 9-307(2). See dicta in National Shawmut Bank v. Jones, 108 N.H. 386,
236 A.2d 484 [4 UCC REP. Smwv. 1021] (1967).
131. Medico Leasing Co. v. Smith, 457 P.2d 548 [6 UCC REP. Srmy. 786] (Okla. 1969).
132. Godfrey v. Gilsdorf, - Nev. -, 476 P.2d 3 [8 UCC REP. Smv. 316] (1970).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
protection to this financier. In most secured transactions, a security in-
terest continues in the collateral in spite of any sale, exchange, or other
disposition. 83 However, if the sale, exchange or other disposition is au-
thorized in the security agreement "or otherwise"' 184 the security interest
in the specific collateral is cut off and the holder of the security interest
will then have a claim in the proceeds received in the sale or exchange of
the original collateral. 185 The proceeds can consist of cash (money and
checks) or be of a non-cash nature (accounts, chattel paper, negotiable
documents and instruments, or tangible trade-in goods). 36 Normally, in
the case of inventory the debtor will be expressly authorized to sell the
inventory and the security agreement and financing statement will both
cover proceeds; this arrangement will give continuous perfection to
the inventory lender."' In the event that the financing statement fails to
claim an interest in proceeds, the lender must perfect within ten days
after the debtor receives the proceeds of the sale of the inventory. 8'
Somewhat surprisingly, most of the cases involving proceeds questions
have revolved around the basic issue: "What are proceeds?" rather than
exotic questions dealing with perfection vis-a-vis the trustee in bank-
ruptcy, etc.
2. THE NATURE OF PROCEEDS (9-306(1) AND (2))
In a case decided under the 1953 version of Section 9-306, it was
held that a floor plan financier of new cars under a security agreement
covering proceeds would have rights in a car which was received by the
dealer when he exchanged one of the financed cars for another car from
another dealer. 3 9 In addition, the proceeds clause under Section 9-306
would reach cars (in the hands of the dealer's receiver) which the dealer
had purchased with funds received from the sale of cars which were
covered by the floor plan security interest provided that it could be
proved that the funds received were in fact used to purchase the cars in
question. It would appear that this decision would not be impaired by
the 1962 version of Section 9-306. It has been held in another case under
the 1953 version of 9-306,"4° that used cars taken as trade-in cars by a
car dealer would be subject to the floor plan security interest as proceeds.
The court noted that the particular security agreement provided that "the
133. U.C.C. § 9-306(2).
134. The facts in Pieper v. First Nat'l Bank, 453 S.W.2d 926 [7 UCC RzP. SERv. 858]
(Mo. 1970) are a classical illustration of the words "or otherwise."
135. Id.
136. U.C.C. § 9-306(1).
137. U.C.C. § 9-306(3).
138. Id.
139. Girard Trust Corn Exch. Bank v. Warren Lepley Ford, Inc., (No. 3), 25 Pa. D. &
C.2d 395 [1 UCC REP. SERV. 531] (Ct. C.P., Phila. County 1958).
140. Howarth v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 203 F. Supp. 279 [1 UCC REP. SEav.
515] (W.D. Pa. 1962).
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following proceeds are also covered: . . (b) merchandise taken in
trade."
14 '
It should be noted that Section 9-307(1) is not the only provision
in the Code which enables a buyer under certain circumstances to take
free of a security interest in inventory. In some cases the inventory fi-
nancier may authorize the debtor to sell the inventory free of the security
interest. For example, a buyer of an expensive piece of special order in-
ventory machinery may enter into an agreement with his seller that all
payments are to be made to the seller and the inventory financier of the
seller as joint payees and the court may then find that although Section
9-307(1) does not protect the buyer from the claims of the inventory
lender, Section 9-306(2) does.14
2
It sometimes happens that courts deal with inventory problems
without ever recognizing them. The case of Noble Co. v. Mack Financial
Corp.x4 is merely one illustration of this statement. Noble sold three
Autocar trucks to A.B.C. Truck Rentals, Inc., and obtained a purchase
money security interest in the trucks; however, a financing statement
was never filed. Subsequently, A.B.C. Truck Rentals traded two of the
Autocar Trucks to Mack Trucks as part of the purchase price of two
Mack trucks. Noble agreed to this transaction on condition that A.B.C.
Truck Rentals obtain a Small Business Administration loan and apply
the incomes received from the operation to the two Mack trucks to pay
off the debt to Noble. Mack Trucks retained a purchase money security
interest in the Mack trucks which were sold to A.B.C., and Mack then
assigned the security interest to Mack Financial Corporation which later
repossessed the two trucks and sold them to satisfy its security interest.
Noble then claimed that its unperfected security interest in the two
Autocar Trucks carried over into the proceeds of their trade-in into the
Mack Trucks and it was superior to the purchase money interest of
Mack in the same trucks on the basis that Mack Trucks knew of Noble's
interest at the inception of the transaction. The court first overlooked the
fact that since these trucks were apparently being used for rental pur-
poses by A.B.C. Truck Rentals, they should be classified as inventory
because they were to be "held by a person who holds them for sale or
lease or to be furnished under contracts of service .... ,1144 The court then
turned to a discussion of Section 9-301 which was irrelevant to the facts
of the case. The court then correctly noted that under Section 9-306(2)
Noble's security interest in the trucks would be deemed to follow into
the proceeds of the sale of these two trucks, namely the two new Mack
trucks. However, since Noble failed to perfect its security interest by
filing, Section 9-312(4) would serve to cut off Noble's security interest
141. Id. at 286 [1 UCC REP. SERv. at 523].
142. Farnura v. C.J. Merrill, Inc., - Me. -, 264 A.2d 150 [7 UCC REP. SERv. 625]
(1970).
143. - R.I. -, 264 A.2d 325 [7 UCC REP. SEr. 842] (1970).
144. U.C.C. § 9-109(4).
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in proceeds in favor of Mack Trucks' properly filed purchase money
security interest. Unfortunately, the facts fail to indicate that Mack
filed its financing statement within the ten-day grace period provided by
Section 9-312(4). The court was quite correct in holding that the fact
that Mack Trucks had actual knowledge of Noble's unperfected security
interest would not deprive Mack of its rights under Section 9-312. But
one nagging question remains: If the court had correctly labeled these
two trucks as inventory, would the actions of Mack Trucks have been
-a sufficient compliance with Subsection 3 of Section 9-312? The author
suggests not and that Noble should have won on the basis that when
neither security interest holder has perfected as against the other, then
priority should be determined in the order of "attachment" under Sub-
section 9-312 (5) (c).
A properly perfected security interest in inventory and its proceeds
will encompass an account receivable growing out of the sale of the in-
ventory' 45 to a buyer, and this right of the inventory lender will not be cut
off by the appointment of a receiver for the insolvent seller before the
buyer of the inventory makes any payment to the now insolvent seller.
The payments to be made on the account will be owing to the inventory
lender and not to the receiver. 48
A buyer in the ordinary course of business of new cars who has not
paid the entire purchase price to the car dealer must pay the balance to
the floor plan lender, and the money is not subject to the claims of the
creditors of the dealer.'
47
Section 9-306(2) provides that "a security interest continues in col-
lateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof by the
debtor unless his action was authorized by the secured party . . . ." One
court has construed this provision as continuing the perfection of a se-
curity interest in the inventory of a drugstore when the store is sold
without the consent or knowledge of the secured party; there is no neces-
sity of filing a new financing statement or of refiling the security agree-
ment itself which agreement was held to meet the requirements of Section
9-402.148
Section 9-306(2) can have some unusual applications which operate
to the detriment of the inventory lender when officials of the business
indulge in questionable dealings. In Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v.
Middlesboro Motor Sales, Inc.149 an incorporated car dealer's inventory
was subject to a floor plan security interest. The wife of the owner of the
corporation was secretary-treasurer. The wife and a chief salesman each
145. U.C.C. §§ 9-306(1) and (4) (a) and 9-105(g).
146. Farnum v. CJ. Merrill, Inc., - Me. -, 264 A.2d 150 [7 UCC REP. SEav. 6251
(1970).
147. Security Nat'l Bank v. Olins of New York Inc., New York Law Journal, Jan. 11,
1968, at 19 [4 UCC REP. SERv. 965] (1968).
148. Ryan v. Rolland, 434 F.2d 353 [8 UCC REP. SEav. 383] (10th Cir. 1970).
149. 424 S.W.2d 409 4 UCC REP. Szy. 1126] (Ky. Ct. App. 1968).
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"purchased" a car from the dealer. The salesman gave back a security
interest for the purchase price to the dealer and the security interest was
assigned to a bank while the wife dealt directly with the bank and gave
the bank a purchase money security interest. Although the court labeled
the conduct of the wife and the chief-salesman as being of a questionable
character, no evidence was shown that the bank had knowledge of their
activities. The court held, quite correctly, that neither the wife nor the
chief-salesman were buyers in ordinary course of business under Sections
9-307 and 1-201(9) of the Code. However, the original floor plan se-
curity agreement provided that the dealer "shall have liberty to exhibit
and to sell each chattel in the ordinary course of trade and for the re-
spective Principal Obligations shown in the respective statements."'150
The court held that under Section 9-306(2) the security interest in pro-
ceeds as provided for in the original floor plan security agreement was
cut off by this authorization clause in the same agreement. The court
noted that the evidence at the trial indicated that purchasers of the type
involved in this case were common among car dealers in the area and,
therefore, the sales were "in the ordinary course of trade" as called for
in the floor plan security agreement. It would seem that it would be wise,
in light of this case, for draftsmen to remove clauses of the kind involved
in this case and to spell out that only sales to buyers in the ordinary
course of business under Sections 9-307 and 1-201(9) will be authorized.
Section 9-306(2) was again used in a recent case' 5' involving cattle.
A cattle buyer had been engaged primarily as a buyer for Swift & Co.,
but he also bought and sold cattle on his own account. A bank had a
continuing security agreement covering his livestock, feed, and inventory.
The bank seized 85 head of cattle and sold them in spite of the fact that
the debtor-dealer told the bank that the cattle belonged to Swift. Swift
brought suit against the bank and the buyer of the cattle from the bank.
The court first held that the cattle were farm products and that the bank's
security interest was invalid because the bank filed its financing state-
ment with the Secretary of State rather than in the county as required
under North Dakota law. The bank, of course, contended that the cattle
in the hands of the buyer were not "farm products" but "inventory" and
that its filing was proper. The court seemingly rejected this argument,
and then, in a moment of uncertainty, seemed to agree that the cattle
were inventory goods. Then the court noted that the security agreement
between the buyer and the bank provided that the buyer "will not sell,
lease or otherwise dispose of the collateral other than in the ordinary
course of its business .... , The court then tied in this clause with
Section 9-306(2) and held that since the buyer had "blanket permis-
sion '153 to sell the cattle, Swift which was a purchaser in the ordinary
150. Id. at 412 [4 UCC REP. Srmv. at 1131] (emphasis in original).
151. Swift & Co. v. Jamestown Natl Bank, 426 F.2d 1099 [7 UCC REP. Smv. 7881 (8th
Cir. 1970).
152. Id. at 1103 [7 UCC REP. Smv. at 7931 (emphasis in original).
19711
UNIVERSITY. OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
course of business took free of the bank's security interest even though it
might have been properly perfected.
3. CASH PROCEEDS PROBLEMS (9-306(4) (d) (11))
A lender who has a properly perfected security interest in "all in-
ventory, merchandise, accounts receivable, fixtures and proceeds or prod-
ucts thereof"' 54 of a hobby and art store has an enforceable security
interest in and priority over undeposited, uncommingled, identifiable cash
proceeds received in the regular course of business from the sale of in-
ventory. Once these cash proceeds are deposited in a general bank account
the perfected interest in this cash is limited to the amount received by
the debtor within the ten-day period preceding the filing of the petition
in bankruptcy.
4. REPOSSESSED GOODS AS PROCEEDS (9-306 (5) (d))
The recent Oklahoma case of Osborn v. First National Bank'55 illus-
strates some of the dangers faced by a lender whose debtor-dealer re-
possesses a car and then resells it. A bank had acted as floor plan lender
for a car dealer and had also taken consumer paper from the dealer. The
bank took chattel paper with recourse from the dealer for a car sale and
a financing statement was filed. The purchaser defaulted on several oc-
casions, and the bank notified the dealer who subsequently, without the
knowledge or authority of the bank, repossessed the car and sold it to
another dealer who in turn sold it to the defendant. The bank contended
that the original perfection of its security interest carried over and was
effective against the retail buyer. The court held that the bank was
estopped to deny that the dealer had authority to repossess the car from
the original buyer with the apparent authority to sell it again, and that
the case was governed by Section 9-306(5) (d), which provides that the
unpaid transferee of the chattel paper must perfect its security interest
by either taking possession of the chattel or by filing a new security in-
terest as to the dealer in order to prevail over a purchaser of the returned
or repossessed goods. Section 9-306(5) (d), in effect, provides that the
original perfection does not carry over into the repossessed goods. It
should be noted that even if the buyer of the repossessed goods takes the
car in satisfaction of an antecedent debt, he will still be a "purchaser"
under 9-306(5) (d) and be able to cut off the original security interest.
Under a "straight" Section 9-307(1) transaction, the sale could not be
made for an antecedent debt.
153. Id. at 1103 [7 UCC REP. SERV. at 794].
154. In re Gibson, 6 UCC REP. SERV. 1193, 1194 (W.D. Okla. 1969) following U.C.C. §
9-306(4) (d) (ii).
155. 472 P.2d 440 [7 UCC REP. SmV. 908] (Okla. 1970).
[Vol. XXV
INVENTORY SECURITY
5. FINANCIER OF INVENTORY VERSUS FINANCIER OF
CHATTEL PAPER (9-306 vs. 9-308)
The classic contest between the lender on the inventory and the
financier of chattel paper which is the proceeds of the sale of this inven-
tory arose in a lower New York court.15 A lady purchased a used car
from a dealer. Her purchase price consisted of a security agreement
calling for monthly payments, a trade-in auto, a supposed down payment
of $443.00 and a promise to pay another $100 within thirty days. Her
supposed down payment was not paid; in actuality it consisted of her
oral promise to pay it when she received an income tax refund. The buyer
and the dealer orally agreed that the dealer would keep possession of the
car until she made the cash down payment of $443.00. Before she could
make the payment, the floor plan lender of the dealer seized all of the
cars on the dealer's lot, including the one purchased by the lady. Litiga-
tion ensued between the financier of the retail purchase and the floor
plan lender; the lady purchaser's whereabouts were unknown at the
time of the trial. The court held that the chattel paper beween the pur-
chaser and "her" finance company was proceeds of the sale of inventory
and initially subject to the floor plan security agreement, but that under
Section 9-308 the purchase-money financier of the lady's purchase would
have priority over the floor plan lender. The court seemingly held that
the applicability of Section 9-308 hinged upon the question of whether
the lady was a buyer in the ordinary course of business. It is submitted
that under the second sentence of Section 9-308, the buyer in the ordinary
course status of the buyer of the car is quite irrelevant-what is impor-
tant is that the financier of the chattel paper operate "in the ordinary
course of his business." Regardless of this latter point, the court was
correct in holding that the financier of the chattel paper prevailed over
the floor plan lender on the inventory.
A further, and most unusual, aspect of the contest between the fi-
nancier of inventory and the financier of chattel paper was presented to
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.' 57 A bank floor planned the auto-
mobiles of a retail dealer; the floor plan security agreement covered
proceeds. The dealer sold a car to a buyer and the buyer gave back a
"bailment lease" (security agreement in Pennsylvania) which the dealer
sold to a discounter. The discounter paid the dealer by check and the
dealer delivered this same check to the bank which had floor planned
the car. The dealer requested that the bank turn over the title certificate
which it held for the car; the bank refused to do so and used the title
certificate "as a lever" to induce the buyer to execute a new bailment
156. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525 [5 UCC REP.
SERV. 226] (Sup. Ct., Erie County 1968).
157. Associates Discount Corp. v. Old Freeport Bank, 421 Pa. 609, 220 A.2d 621 [3 UCC
REP. SFV. 481] (1966).
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lease in favor of the bank and induced the buyer to make payments to it
rather than the discounter who held the original "bailment lease." The
bank then applied the discounter's check which it had received from the
dealer in payment of other obligations owed by the dealer to the bank.
The court held that the buyer was a buyer in ordinary course of business
and he cut off the lien of the bank in the car, but the bank then had a
security interest in the proceeds from the sale of the car-the chattel
paper. But, this chattel paper security interest was in turn cut off by the
sale to the discounter under Section 9-308 of the Code. However, the
bank's security interest would extend and include the check with which
the discounter paid the dealer. As a result, the bank could keep the check,
but it was deemed to be a constructive trustee for the amount of pay-
ments which it had received from the buyer. As a result of this case, it
can be said that the concept of proceeds in the sale of inventory will
extend to the proceeds (the check) which in turn was the proceeds from
the sale of the chattel paper which was in turn the proceeds from the sale
of the car.
6. ARE INSURANCE PROCEEDS INVENTORY PROCEEDS?
Section 9-306(l) of the UCC provides that proceeds includes what-
ever is received when collateral or proceeds is sold, exchanged, collected
or otherwise disposed of. It would appear rather obvious that a casualty
loss from fire, windstorm, or other causes could not be classfied as a sale
or exchange which are consensual transactions. The only possibility re-
maining is that the phrase "otherwise disposed of" might include the
collection of insurance "proceeds" in the event that the goods are "dis-
posed of" by virtue of some involuntary act. Courts in Rhode Island .58
and Maine159 have held that the "otherwise disposed of" phrase cannot
be found to include the involuntary conversion of insured goods, with the
result that the holder of the security interest has no claim against the
insurance proceeds as proceeds of the goods under 9-306(1).
It should also be noted that Section 9-104(g) provides that Article 9
does not apply "to a transfer of an interest or claim in or under any
policy of insurance." The Official Comment notes that rights under in-
surance policies "do not fit easily under a general commercial statute and
are adequately covered by existing law."'160 The Rhode Island Supreme
Court used this comment for the view that indicates "a legislative recog-
nition that this right to the insurance moneys is a matter of contract and
does not run with the goods."'
In the absence of any parochial state statute giving a lender a claim
158. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Prudential Inv. Corp., 101 R.I. 287, 222 A.2d 571
[3 UCC REP. SERv. 6961 (1966).
159. Quigley v. Caron, __ Me. __, 247 A.2d 94 [5 UCC REP. SERV. 943] (1968).
160. U.C.C. § 9-104(g), Comment 7.
161. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Prudential Inv. Corp., 101 R.I. 287, 295, 222 A.2d
S71, 576 [3 UCC REP. SEnv. 696, 7021 (1966).
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to insurance proceeds, it would appear that lenders should insist that
debtors assign any rights under insurance policies to them and arrange for
a loss-payable indorsement to be issued by the insurance company's agent.
If the suggested procedure is not followed, the "secured" lender may
discover when his debtor has suffered a covered loss that the debtor has
assigned the insurance proceeds to another creditor, or another creditor
has garnished the proceeds in the hands of the insurance company. A
facet of this inventory-proceeds vis-a-vis insurance-proceeds was pre-
sented in a recent lower court opinion from Wisconsin'0 2 which held that
a loss-payable clause in insurance on inventory which was payable to the
mortgagee was effective against the claims of creditors who had judgment
liens against the inventory even though the chattel mortgage was not
properly perfected. This case indirectly stands for the proposition that if
the secured party is "lucky" enough to have the encumbered inventory
goods destroyed by fire he will recover from the insurance company, but
if the goods are not destroyed he will lose at the hands of the judgment
lien creditors. This is a rather strange result.
D. Consignment Suppliers Versus Inventory Lenders
(2-326, 9-312 and 9-306)
It is and has been a common business practice for consignors to
deliver goods to consignees under contracts whereby the consignee is an
agent with power and right of sale to third parties and with a right to
return the goods (without any obligation to pay for them) in the event
that the goods cannot be sold. A "true" consignment is based upon an
agency concept that the title to the goods remains in the consignor and
any transfer of title is in a direct line from the consignor to the customer
of the consignee-agent. Prior to the Code, a true consignor could reclaim
his goods from a creditor of the consignee.113 At the other end of the
pre-Code spectrum was the "sale or return" contract wherein the "con-
signee" purchased and paid for the goods from a consignor but with the
right to return them if unsold. Under this latter arrangement, creditors of
the consignee could levy on the goods and the consignor would not care
because he had received payment. 64 In between these two extremes there
is and was a variety of other arrangements for the distribution of goods.
Experts have skirmished over whether the consignment concept is limited
to either a security device or a price-fixing device or whether it can en-
compass a number of other purposes in addition to these two.'0 5 For
purposes of this article, the approach narrows to the question as to
162. Distributor's Warehouse, Inc. v. Madison Auto Parts & Service Corp., 8 UCC REP.
SEv. 569 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Dane County 1970).
163. See 2 W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
736-54 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 2 W. HAWxLAND].
164. Id. at 738-39.
165. E.g., see Duesenberg, Consignments Under the UCC: A Comment on Emerging
Principles, 26 Bus. LAwYER 565 (1970).
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whether the consignment device is to be controlled by Article 2 or by
Article 9 and the consequences of either choice.
This whole issue has been nicely raised by a relatively recent Wis-
consin case. 100 Columbia International Corp. shipped machinery to itself
in care of Kramer Industries; subsequently, Preci-Matic also shipped
machinery to itself care of Kramer, and then later assigned all of its
(Preci-Matic) rights to Columbia. Kramer was to demonstrate these
machines and to sell them at a fixed price. The contracts between Colum-
bia and Kramer and Preci-Matic and Kramer reserved title in the "con-
signors," and risk was placed on Kramer. Prior to these transactions,
Kramer had entered into a security agreement with Lakeshore Corpora-
tion under which all of Kramer's inventory and after-acquired inventory
(as well as equipment) was collateral for a loan. Later, Lakeshore peti-
tioned for the appointment of a receiver for Kramer and one was ap-
pointed. After the appointment of the receiver, Lakeshore assigned its
security interest to Kepco which had full knowledge of the Columbia
claim to the machinery. A few weeks later, the receiver sold all of his
interest to Kepco and Columbia claimed the machinery by bringing
replevin against Kepco. Kepco asserted that Columbia's claims to the
machinery were subordinate to the receiver's title and Lakeshore's per-
fected security interest. In order to resolve whether this consignment was
a "security interest consignment" or a price fixing consignment-a "true"
consignment-the court noted that Section 9-102 (2) provides that Article
9 applies to a "consignment intended as security," and that Section 9-113
provides that a "security interest arising solely under the Article on Sales
(Article 2) is subject to the provisions of this Article (Article 9)."
Finally, Section 1-301(37) states that "Unless a lease or consignment is
intended as security [an interest in personal property to secure payment
of an obligation], reservation of title thereunder is not a 'security interest'
but a consignment is in any event subject to the provisions on consign-
ment sales (Section 2-326)." In short, if the consignment is intended as a
"security interest" then it is subject to all of the provisions of Article 9,
while a "true consignment" (i.e., one which is not intended as security)
is governed by Article 2 except for the limited idea that filing will be
necessary (in the majority of cases) under Article 9 in accordance with
Section 2-326(3)(c). Therefore, inasmuch as Columbia did not file a
financing statement, its true consignment interest was cut off by the re-
ceiver under Section 9-301, and since Kepco purchased the receiver's
interest it steps into his shoes with exactly the same rights. There seems
little doubt that the court reached the correct result. However, the author
must quarrel with at least three points raised by the court: First, the
court, after saying this was a true consignment-one not intended as
security-then held that Article 9 "is circuitously brought into play by




the filing provision in Sec. 402.326(3) [2-326(3)] 111 T and stated that
under Sections 9-201 and 9-301 the unfiled "security interest" of Columbia
was superior to non-lien creditors. The court was in error; as stated by
Professor Hawkland, "General Creditors as well as lien creditors are
entitled to this protection (Filing, etc.). This is made clear by the use of
the unmodified word 'creditors' in Section 2-326 and by the broad defini-
tion of the term 'creditor' in subsection 1-201(12).'168 Second, as pointed
out by Mr. Duesenberg' 69 the court was led into error by good masters
in deciding that there are only two kinds of consignment transactions;
and, third, the court ignored the fact that Kepco's properly perfected
inventory security interest which embraced after-acquired property would
have had priority over the Columbia consignment transaction without
any reference to the receiver-Kepco need not have traced any "title"
through the receiver; Kepco already had priority.
The inter-play between Section 2-326 and Article 9 was nicely illus-
trated in In re De'Cor Wallcovering Studios, Inc.171 wherein a supplier
delivered lighting fixtures to a retail dealer for display and sale, with the
dealer to pay the supplier the wholesale price. The only thing in writing
was a "Showroom Order Form" which simply listed the items and the
wholesale price. A small amount of the goods were sold and the dealer
went bankrupt. The court held that it was clear that the goods were
delivered as a "security consignment" rather than as a "price-fixing
device," and since the security agreement was not in writing it was in-
valid under Section 9-203 (1) (b). Additionally, under Section 2-326 and
in accordance with the Columbia International'7' case since there was-no
filed financing statement (regardless of whether the agreement was a
price-fixing device or a security device), the trustee in bankruptcy cut
off the supplier's right to reclamation.
A relatively recent New Jersey case172 furnished an unusual appli-
cation of Section 2-326. Crest was an installer of plumbing and heating
apparatus, and was in financial trouble. Elite Sales had been selling inven-
tory supplies to Crest. Elite then formed Vonins, Inc. which agreed to fur-
nish inventory supplies (obtained from Elite) to Crest. In return, Crest
assigned its existing installation contracts to Vonins and Vonins agreed
to employ Crest as its sub-contractor for the assigned contracts and
others which might be obtained. Vonins agreed to pay Crest 40 percent
of Vonins' billings on each completed job. Crest later executed an assign-
ment for the benefit of creditors under New Jersey law, and the assignee
for creditors entered into litigation with Vonins as to the title to the in-
167. Id. at -. , 175 N.W.2d at 473 [7 UCC REP. SERV. at 660].
168. -2 W.'HAW'KLAND, supra note 163, at 747.
169. See note 163 supra.
170. 8 UCC REP. SERv. 59 (E.D. Wis. 1970). Accord, In re Gross Mfg. & Importing
Co., 328 F. Supp. 905 [9 UCC REP. SEarv. 355] (D. N.J. 1971).
171. See note 166 supra and accompanying text.
S1,72. Vonins, Inc. V. Raff -101 N.J. Super. .172, 243 A.2d 836 ES UCC REP. SEmv. 433]
(Super. Ct., App. Div. 1968).
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ventory supplies in the possession of Crest at the time of the assignment.
The court held that it was not necessary under Section 2-326 for Crest to
have been engaged in "over-the-counter retail selling of plumbing equip-
ment."' 78 The fact that Crest maintained a place of business at which it
dealt in goods of the kind involved was sufficient; even though an over-
all price would be charged for the installation, the price would include a
price for the installed components. Vonins thus delivered the goods to
Crest for sale to others, and that sale need not have been consummated at
Crest's premises for Section 2-326 to apply. The court further found
that the "exceptions" to Section 2-326 were not shown by Vonins, and
that the assignee for creditors was under New Jersey Law and Section
1-201(12) to be treated as if he were an actual creditor with rights
greater than those possessed by the assignor-creditors of Crest. As a
result, the assignee cut off the interest of Vonins in the inventory supplies.
Although not mentioned by the Court, it should be noted that Sec-
tion 1-201(12) in its definition of the word "creditor" includes the
wording "a general creditor." It would appear, therefore, that a "general
creditor" as distinguished from a "secured creditor" may invalidate a
2-326 transaction,"' while a "general creditor" as distinguished from a
"lien creditor" or "secured creditor" would not be able to invalidate an
unperfected Article 9 transaction.' 75 It is believed that this is an addi-
tional reason for not using a "sale or return" arrangement without per-
fecting under Article 9.
The inter-relationship between Sections 2-326, 9-204 and 9-108 was
nicely drawn in Sussen Rubber Co. v. Hertz. 78 Lee Motor Products was a
supplier of inventory auto parts, and it agreed to extend credit to Hill-
crest (a dealer in auto parts) in return for a security interest in all the
assets of Hillcrest including any after-acquired property. Subsequently,
Lee appointed Hertz, as trustee, to be the secured party. Lee extended
credit in the initial sum of $15,000 and additional sums subsequently.
Still later, Sussen Rubber consigned inventory goods to Hillcrest and a
salesman for Lee was informed of this fact. Hillcrest defaulted under
its contract with Lee, and Hertz took possession of Hillcrest's assets and
sold them. Sussen Rubber notified Hertz before he sold the goods that
some of the goods were claimed by Sussen under its consignment con-
tract. The court held that the after-acquired property clause in the secu-
rity agreement between Lee and Hillcrest would initially be controlled
by Section 9-204. Section 9-204 requires that there be a security agree-
ment creating a security interest, that value be given and that the debtor
must have rights in the collateral. The court stated that there was no
173. Id. at 181, 243 A.2d at 841 [S UCC REP. SEav. 438].
174. American Nat'l Bank v. Tina Marie Homes, Inc., * Colo. App. -, 476 P.2d 573
[8 UCC REP. SERV. 281] (1970).
175. In re Kirchen, S UCC REP. SERV. 284 (E.D. Mich. 1967).
176. 19 Ohio App. 2d 1, 480 Ohio. Op. 2d 12, 249 N.E.2d 65 [6 UCC RP. SERV. 769]
(Ct. App., Cuyahoga County 1969).
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doubt about the existence of the security agreement and that value had
been given. The court noted that the effect of this later idea of value
must also be tested by the terms of Section 9-108 which require that a
security interest
in the after-acquired collateral shall be deemed to be taken for
new value and not as security for an antecedent debt if the
debtor acquires his rights in such collateral either in the ordi-
nary course of his business or under a contract of purchase
made pursuant to the security agreement within a reasonable
time after new value is given.
Hillcrest was extended credit for $15,000 initially and it did acquire
"rights in such collateral" in the ordinary course of its business. Finally,
the court held that Hillcrest need not be deemed an "owner" of the con-
signed goods in order for Lee's after-acquired security clause to fasten
on these goods. The court was less than clear as to how Sections 9-204
and 9-108 relate to Section 2-326, and the relationship only becomes
clear when it is remembered that the word "creditor" in Section 2-326
includes the concept of a "secured creditor" under Section 1-201(12).
The case of In re Mincow Bag Co.177 points out a risky way in
which a vendor may have all of the advantages of being a consignor with-
out the handicaps itemized in Section 2-326. Finale Inc., manufactured
ladies gloves and entered into an agreement with Mincow Bag Co.
whereby Finale delivered shipments of gloves on consignment to various
stores wherein Mincow had contracts for the sale of these gloves by
employees of these stores. Title to the gloves remained in Finale and
Mincow would receive commissions for having arranged the sales by the
store outlets. Mincow never had physical possession of the goods. Min-
cow subsequently made an assignment for the benefit of creditors, and
the assignee claimed gloves in the possession of Finale which it had pre-
viously assigned to Mincow and any proceeds received by Finale from
the sale of merchandise consigned by Finale to Mincow. The court held
that inasmuch as Mincow never had possession at its place of business
"at which he deals in goods of the kind involved," Section 2-326 could
have no application and the assignee would have no claim to the goods.
Section 2-326 operates to cut off a consignor's ownership rights
when the consignee is under the umbrella of an existing security interest
in inventory with an after-acquired property clause, but does it also cut
off the rights of a holder of a security interest in the consigned goods?
This question was partly answered in a recent Colorado case.178 A valu-
able tractor was subject to a recorded pre-Code chattel mortgage in
Colorado. The owner and the mortgagee together authorized a dealer to
177. 29 App. Div. 2d 400, 288 N.Y.S.2d 364 [5 UCC REP. SEnv. 60] (Sup. Ct., App.
Div. 1968), aff'd, 24 N.Y.2d 77, 300 N.Y.S.2d 115 [6 UCC REP. SERV. 112] (1969).
178. American Nat'l Bank v. Etter, 476 P.2d 287 [8 UCC REP. Smv. 298] (Colo. Ct.
App. 1970).
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make repairs on the tractor and then to sell it for a set figure with any
excess going to the dealer. The dealer had been receiving floor plan
financing from a bank under a security interest with an after-acquired
property clause. The dealer later defaulted and the bank brought replevin
for the tractor and other inventory. The court held that pre-Code Col-
orado law governed the validity and priority of the chattel mortgage
and that under this law the chattel mortgage had priority over the bank,
but that the bank's after-acquired property clause cut off the rights of
the owner of the tractor. The court noted the argument that since the
mortgagee authorized the dealer to sell the tractor this should serve
to cut off the mortgagee's interests under pre-Code law; however, the
court held this pre-Code law was applicable solely when the goods are
sold to a third party rather than when the goods come within the reach
of an after-acquired property clause of a security agreement.
Section 2-326 provides that where goods are delivered to a person
for sale and such person maintains a place of business at which he deals
in goods of the kind involved "under a name other than the name of the
person making delivery" then with respect to claims of the creditors
conducting the business the goods are deemed to be on sale or return. In
Mann v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp.,17 Kline leased a gas station from
Clark which was to be operated under the Clark trade name, but with
the name of Kline on a sign posted over the doorway. Gasoline was
"consigned" to Kline by Clark under a retail dealer consignment agree-
ment which provided that Kline agreed that the gasoline was to remain
the property of Clark until sold and that all of the proceeds of the sale
of the gasoline were to be remitted daily to Clark by Kline. Kline was
responsible for all gasoline and all receipts for gasoline even though there
might be losses of either or both from theft or other causes. The court
held that even though the gas station was conducted under the Clark
trade name, the presence of the name of the dealer over the entrance
doorway coupled with the terms of the consignment contract came within
the idea that Kline was operating under a name other than the name
of the person making the delivery, and the trustee in bankruptcy could
cut off the interest of Clark which had not been perfected under Article 9.
The "Uniform" Commercial Code becomes less than uniform in in-
ventory questions dealing with motor vehicles, mobile homes and other
vehicles which might come within the provisions of state statutes dealing
with the title to motor vehicles. The problem of non-conformity becomes
acute when courts misinterpret the Code. The Florida case of Taylor
179. 302 F. Supp. 1376 [6 UCC REP. SERV. 12531 (E.D. Mo. 1969). A federal district
court has expressly followed the rationale of the Mann case and held that the insolvent
debtor's return [within four months before it filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy] to
the consignor of unsold goods constituted a preferential transfer under Section 60(b) of the
Bankruptcy Act and Section 2-326(3) of the U.C.C. because of a failure to file a financing
statement at the time of the consignment. In re Gross Mfg. & Importing Co., 328 F.
Supp. 905 [9 UCC REP. SERv. 355] (D. N.J. 1971).
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Mobile Homes v. Founders Investment Corp.8 0 is illustrative of this
latter point. Founders floor planned the inventory of Glover, a retail
dealer in mobile homes. The floor plan security agreement provided for
after-acquired property and a financing statement was properly filed with
the Secretary of State. Subsequently, Taylor, a manufacturer of mobile
homes, delivered "four newly manufactured mobile homes for the pur-
pose of display and retail sale"'81 to Glover. Certificates of title to these
four mobile homes were never issued, nor were statements of origin,
documents of consignment, or any other contracts executed or exchanged
between Taylor and Glover. Taylor never served any notice upon Foun-
ders that it (Taylor) was claiming a purchase money security interest
in the mobile homes in accordance with Section 9-312(3) of the Code.
Glover defaulted and Founders filed suit to foreclose its security interest
and attach all of the inventory of Glover including the four mobile
homes supplied by Taylor. Taylor then instituted a replevin action
against Founders, and Founders asserted that it had priority because
Taylor did not comply with Section 9-312(3) in that Taylor did not
notify Founders that it (Taylor) claimed a purchase money security
interest in the four mobile homes. It was stipulated that the four mobile
homes "were not sold by Taylor to Glover but were merely placed on
his sale lot for the purpose of display and retail sale to the public."' 82
The court further noted that "Glover possessed no indicia of ownership
sufficient to enable him to pass title to the units to a purchaser."'83 As a
consequence of this approach, the court held that Glover was not a pur-
chaser of the mobile homes and Taylor had no purchase money interest
in them. Therefore, Taylor had no obligation to notify Founders of "its
interest in the units in order to preserve the priority of its interest
over the security interest held by Founders in Glover's after-acquired
inventory."'
It is submitted that the Florida court completely missed the mark;
the stipulation that Taylor did not sell the mobile homes to Glover was
irrelevent in light of Code Section 2-326(3). This section is designed
to protect creditors of the person who "maintains a place of business at
which he deals in goods of the kind involved," and under this Section
any private contractual terms between the business man and his sup-
plier cannot affect third parties. The court never cited Section 2-326,
and it is doubtful if it was even considered by the court or counsel.
The Taylor case ought to be compared with an earlier Georgia
case 85 involving somewhat similar facts. Peoples Automobile Loan and
180. 238 So.2d 116 7 UCC REP. SERv. 13631 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
181. Id. at 117 [7 UCC REP. SERv. at 13641.
182. Id. at 119 [7 UCC REP. SvRV. at 13671.
183. Id. at 119 [7 UCC REP. SERV. at 1367].
184. Id. at 119 [7 UCC REP. SERV. at 1367].
185. McDonald v. Peoples Automobile Loan & Fin. Corp., 115 Ga. App. 483, i54 S.E.2d
1886 [4 IUCC REP. SEav. 49] (1967).
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Finance Corporation had a properly perfected security interest covering
all of the motor vehicle inventory and after acquired inventory of Thur-
mond, a franchised new car dealer and licensed used car dealer. McDon-
ald, a used car dealer, sold two used cars to Thurmond but held the
titles to the cars pending payment by Thurmond. McDonald gave Thur-
mond bills of sale with the description of the cars left blank and
Thurmond was authorized to fill in the descriptions. Thurmond filled in
the descriptions of the two cars and delivered the bills of sale to Peoples
and received advances. Thurmond failed to pay Peoples for moneys
advanced on other cars which Thurmond sold. Peoples then levied on
all of the remaining cars in Thurmond's possession, including the two
cars sold by McDonald. The court held that the transactions between
Peoples and Thurmond and between Thurmond and McDonald were
not covered by the motor vehicle statutes of Georgia, but solely by the
Code. The court first held that since there was no written security
agreement between McDonald and Thurmond, there could not be a valid
security interest by McDonald in the cars because he had given up pos-
session. But even if there were a valid security agreement between them,
McDonald failed to comply with the requisites of Section 9-312(3) and
Peoples would have priority. The majority opinion of the court flatly
rejected any possibility of Section 2-326 being applicable because the
sales between McDonald and Thurmond were not sales or return, while
a special concurring opinion stated that Section 2-326 was applicable
because McDonald did not sell the cars to Thurmond but simply treated
Thurmond as his agent to sell the cars and remit a net amount as the
proceeds for each sale when it was made. A year earlier, the same
Georgia Court of Appeals 8 ' held that when an owner delivered four
cars to a used car dealer under an arrangement whereby the owners
kept possession of the car titles and authorized the dealer to find buyers
for the cars and the dealer would then pay the owners a fixed price for
the cars and the owners would deliver the title certificates to the dealer or
the buyer, that this arrangement was a sale or return transaction under
Section 2-326. Since there is no "sign law"'87 in Georgia, and there was
insufficient proof that the dealer was generally known by his creditors
to sell goods of others, and there was no filing under Article 9, a finance
company which advanced money to the dealer and received trust receipts
and bills of sales for the cars had the right to recover in trover against
the original entrustors. It is to be noted that in both of these Georgia
cases the original entrustor (whether he was claiming as a holder of a
security interest or as an owner) was held to be subservient to an in-
ventory financier. In these two Georgia cases, the entrustor was a mer-
chant-a dealer. In a later case' 88 the same Georgia court held that when
186. Guardian Discount Co. v. Settles, 114 Ga. App. 418, 151 S.E.2d 530 [3 UCC REP.
SzRv. 8381 (1966).
187. See U.C.C. § 2-326(3) (a).




an individual owner of a car delivered the car to a dealer for the purpose
of having the dealer secure offers and to sell the car with the approval
of the owner (the dealer was to receive a commission for his sales services
regardless of the sales price), this transaction was not a "sale or return"
under Section 2-326 so as to be subject to the levy of a lien creditor
against the dealer; the court noted that "for this reason"' 89 the two prior
cases "have no application.')
190
Although filing as required by. a combination of Sections 2-326, and
9-402 in order to perfect a consignment intended as a security interest
would not seem too difficult, it does require the filing of a financing state-
ment. Hence, the filing of a termination statement signed solely by the
consignor and not by the consignee-debtor will not be sufficient to enable
the consignor to successfully maintain reclamation proceedings against
the trustee in bankruptcy.' 91
The consignor of inventory to a dealer is not only subject to having
his interests cut off by a creditor of the consignee-dealer, but if the
goods are consigned for the purpose of sale and the goods are sold to a
buyer in the ordinary course of trade, the buyer also cuts off the con-
signor's interest. 9
2
.E. Defrauded Supplier of Inventory Versus Inventory Lender
(2-702 and 9-312)
In the event that a seller discovers that his buyer has received goods
on credit while the buyer is insolvent, the seller may make a reclamation
demand within ten days after the buyer has received the goods. 98 How-
ever, "if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particular
seller in writing within three months before delivery the ten-day limita-
tion does not apply."'9 4 This section places no outside time limit for
reclamation in the event of written misrepresentation of solvency. One
court has seemingly held that the seller must prove a reliance upon the
buyer's written misrepresentation and that even a check given by the
buyer to the seller (which is subsequently dishonored) could, if relied
upon by the seller, be considered a written misrepresentation of sol-
vency which would raise a question of fact to be determined by. the
trier of fact. 95
Regardless of whether the ten-day or unlimited reclamation period
controls any particular case, Subsection 3 provides that the reclamation
rights of the seller are "subject to the rights of a buyer in ordinary
189. Id. at 105, 159 S.E.2d at 459 [5 UCC REP. SEav. at 93].
190. Id. at 105, 159 S.E.2d at 459 [5 UCC REP. Smiv. at 93].
191. In re Bro Cliff, Inc., 8 UCC REP. SERv. 703 (W.D. Mich. 1971).
192. Kranich & Bach v. Miller, 3 UCC REP. SEarv. 449 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Westchester
County 1966).
193. U.C.C. J 2-702(2).
194. Id.
195. Theo. Hamm Brewing Co. v. -First Trust & Savings Bank,- 103 Ill. App. 2d 190, 242
N.E.2d 911 [S UCC RxP. Sazv. 1230] (1969).
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course or other good faith purchaser or lien creditor" under Article 9,
One court has seemingly overlooked this latter rule 0 8 while another. 7
has, in dicta, stated that a holder of a prior perfected security interest in
inventory who employs an after-acquired property clause would come
within the definition of "purchaser" and thereby cut off the other de-
frauded seller's rights of reclamation. The defrauded seller's right of
reclamation may also be cut off by a lien creditor in those states which
preserved the phrase "lien creditor" in original Section 2-702.
Subsection 3 which provides that the seller's right to reclaim is sub-
ject to a "lien creditor under this Article (Section 2-403)" really fails
to delineate the rights that a lien creditor has vis-a-vis the defrauded
seller because Section 2-403 does not discuss the rights of a lien creditor
but simply refers the reader to Article 9. Section 9-301 articulates the
rights of a lien creditor against a security interest, but the right to
reclaim under 2-702 does not meet the description of a security interest.
Hence, if the phrase "lien creditor" is to have any meaning in Section
2-702, it must impliedly incorporate by reference the pre-Code law of
each state governing the rights of defrauded sellers vis-a-vis lien cred-
itors. " As a result of this approach of a "uniform" law impliedly adopt-
ing a "non-uniform" pattern of state law, one Federal court in applying
Pennsylvania law 19 has held that the lien creditor cuts off the defrauder
seller's rights of reclamation while other federal courts applying Ken-
tucky o0 and Tennessee"' law reach the opposite result. It would appear,
therefore, that a defrauded seller could wind up with number three pri-
ority behind an inventory security interest holder under his after-acquired
property clause and a judgment lien creditor. The defrauded seller will
also, of course, be cut off by a trustee in bankruptcy if the seller fails to
make a demand within the magic ten-day period. 0 2 Of course, this
possible "circuity of liens problem" can be obviated by elimination of
the phrase "lien creditor" from the section in accordance with the 1967
recommendation, 208 and it would appear that fifteen states have now elim-
nated this phrase.204
A rather artful but unsuccessful pyramiding of the old cash sale
concept and the UCC reclamation remedy and buyer in ordinary course
196. Id.
197. Stumbo v. Paul B. Hult Lumber Co., 251 Ore. 20, 444 P.2d 564 [5 UCC REP. SEav.
753] (1968).
198. But see In re Behring & Behring, 5 UCC REP. SERV. 600 (N.D. Tex. 1968) for a
contrary view.
199. In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820 [1 UCC REP. SERv. 159] (3d Cir. 1960).
200. In re Mel Golde Shoes, Inc., 403 F.2d 658 [5 UCC REP. SERV. 1147] (6th Cir. 1968).
201. In re Royalty Homes, Inc., 8 UCC REP. SERV. 61 (E.D. Tenn. 1970).
202. In re Helms Veneer Corp., 287 F. Supp. 840 [5 UCC REP. SERv. 977] (W.D. Va.
1968).
203. Recommendation for Amendment to Uniform Commercial Code, Report No. 3
(1966).
204. 2 ULA 422-23 (1968) and 1971 Supplement at 87.
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theory was attempted in Evans Products v. Jorgensen20 5 An inventory
financier had a properly perfected security interest in the inventory
and proceeds of inventory of a plywood manufacturer. A supplier of
veneer sold veneer to the manufacturer and when payment was not
forthcoming, the supplier subsequently accepted the manufactured ply-
wood in payment. The financier of the manufacturer then claimed that
its security interest covered this plywood which was now in the hands of
the veneer supplier. The veneer supplier then asserted that it was a buyer
in the ordinary course of business, or a cash sale seller, or in the position
of a reclaiming seller which had exchanged its goods for the plywood.
The court quickly held that receiving plywood in payment for an ante-
cedent debt would prevent the supplier from being a buyer in ordinary
course of business. ° Second, the cash sale theory had been buried by
one section of the Code2" 7 and Section 2-507(2) (which provides that
the buyer's rights to dispose or retain goods are conditional upon the
buyer's making payment when it is due and demanded on delivery by
the seller) is effective between the buyer and seller but not as against
the inventory financier.28 Third, the veneer supplier failed to demand a
return of the veneer within the ten-day period as required by Section
2-702. Fourth, the court mentioned in dicta, even if the supplier had
made his demand within ten days, the inventory financier could be
deemed a purchaser who would cut off the supplier's right of reclamation.
Finally, the court rejected any idea that the equitable doctrine of unjust
enrichment can be used to vary the priority rules of Article 9.
A fact pattern greatly resembling a law school examination was pre-
sented in a recent case from North Carolina.20" A number of colleges de-
livered books to a company under an arrangement whereby the company
would microfilm the books and then exchange the microfilm for the books
which were later sold by the microfilm company. The microfilm company
and a bank entered into a security agreement which covered after-
acquired property. The microfilm company became insolvent before it had
completed its contracts with the various colleges, and they sought to
reclaim the books under Section 2-702 of the Code. The court held that
these books were inventory in the hands of the microfilm company, and
that assuming that the microfilm company had made written misrepre-
sentations of solvency within three months prior to the delivery of the
books, the bank as a holder of a perfected security interest in after-
acquired inventory qualified as a good faith purchaser and cut off the
interests of the colleges.
205. 245 Ore. 362, 421 P.2d 978 [3 UCC REP. SERV. 1099] (1966).
206. U.C.C. §§ 9-307(1) and 1-201(9).
207. U.C.C. § 2-403.
208. Cf. In re Mort Co., 208 F. Supp. 309 [1 UCC REP. SERV. 166] (E.D. Pa. 1962).
209. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Academic Archives, Inc., - N.C. App..., 179
S.E.2d 850 18 UCC REP. Ssav. 1197] (1971).
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F. Landlord Versus Inventory Lender
The last sentence of Section 9-102(2) provides that Article 9 shall
"not apply to statutory liens except as provided in Section 9-310." Sec-
tion 9-310 refers to liens for "services or materials" with respect to goods,
and it has been held that this section is not applicable to a landlord's
lien.210 Section 9-104(b) states that Article 9 does not apply to a land-
lord's lien. It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile these two sections.
If the phrase, "landlord's lien," in 9-104(b) refers to "statutory liens"
as used in Section 9-102 (2), then Section 9-104 is redundant. On the
other hand, a form of landlord's lien may be created by the terms of a
lease, rather than by statute, and it might be argued that Section 9-104-
(b) was designed to outlaw even this kind of "consensual landlord's
lien." Official Comment 2 to Section 9-104(b) does nothing to clarify the
problem and merely adds another conundrum. In any event, the Sixth
Circuit has held in a non-inventory case arising in Kentucky that when
a lease provides that the lessor shall have a lien on all the equipment
used in a coal mining lease of land, that Section 9-104(b) refers solely
to the landlord's lien created by statute and not to a lien created by con-
tract. The result was that the lease created "lien" had to comply with
all of Article 9's perfection rules or be held invalid under the bankruptcy
act.21' A somewhat similar view has been held in a federal case arising in
Arkansas. 1 2 It should be noted that Arkansas apparently does not follow
the common law right of a landlord to distrain the goods of his tenant,
and a lease-created lien would seem the only feasible way that a landlord
has in that state to fasten a "lien" upon the inventory of his tenant.
North Carolina also does not follow the common law right of the
landlord to distrain for rent. An interesting fact pattern developed in the
non-inventory case of Dunham's Music House, Inc. v. Asheville Theatres,
Inc.2"3 when a lease-created security interest collided with a purchase-
money security interest in an organ and a piano. A lessor leased premises
to a lessee under a lease which provided that the lessor had a lien against
the lessee's furnishings, fixtures and equipment for any unpaid rent. The
lessee purchased an organ and a piano under a purchase-money security
interest from a third party. Neither the lessor nor the third party filed
a financing statement. Upon default in the payment of the rent the lessor
took possession of the premises and the piano and organ; the third party
then brought suit against the lessor. The court held that the lease created
a security interest within the ambit of Article 9 and that a financing
statement should have been filed. However, the court also held that the
210. In re Einhorn Bros., 171 F. Supp. 655 [1 UCC REP. SmRv. 398] (E.D. Pa.), aff'd,
272 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1959).
211. In re Leckie Freeburn Coal Co., 405 F.2d 1043 [6 UCC REP. Snv. 15] (6th Cir.
1969).
212. In re King Furniture City, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 453 (2 UCC REP. SE v. 795] (E.D.
Ark. 1965).
213. 10 N.C. App. 242, 178 S.E.2d 124 [8 UCC REP. SERV. 734] (1970).
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third party should have filed a financing statement, and, since neither
party filed, priority would be determined by the order of perfection. The
lessor by taking possession under Section 9-503 perfected and had priority
over the purchase-money vendor in accordance with Section 9-312 (5) (b).
The court pointed out that the vendor could easily have protected itself
by filing within ten days after the lessee had received possession of the
organ and piano in accordance with the terms of Section 9-312 (4) which
gives a limited priority to a purchase money security interest when it is
competing against a non-purchase money security interest.
Sections 9-312(3) and (4) give priority (under prescribed condi-
tions) to purchase money security interests over non-purchase money
security interests. The question remains: Does a purchase money security
interest have priority over a "statutory" landlord's lien? One answer was
presented in Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Congressional Motors,
Inc.,214 wherein the court held that under the Maryland law then in effect
a landlord's lien in the automotive inventory of car dealer had priority
over a purchase money security interest which was properly perfected
under the UCC. The court pointed out that the cumulative effect of
Sections 9-102, 9-104 and 9-310 was to leave unaffected the landlord's
lien rules of the various states. It should be mentioned that Maryland
amended its law relating to distraint, and now the holder of a properly
perfected purchase money security interest will have priority over the
holder of a landlord's lien. In a somewhat converse vein, an Illinois
appellate court has held that a non-perfected (no financial statement was
filed) purchase money security interest in consumer goods would not
have priority over a landlord's lien under the law of Illinois; the inference
was that a properly perfected purchase money security interest would
have had priority.215 The impact of the case is weakened by the fact that
the court overlooked that a purchase money security interest in consumer
goods may be perfected in Illinois without filing in accordance with
Section 9-302(1) (d).
As indicated by the preceding cases, it is necessary to look at the
landlord's lien law of each state in conjunction with the Code in order
to determine relative priorities. The necessity for "localizing" the law
under the UCC seems to follow the pre-Code necessity for "localizing.1
21
214. 246 Md. 380, 228 A.2d 463 [4 UCC REP. SERV. 152] (Ct. App. 1967).
215. Harney v. Spellman, 113 Ill. App. 2d 463, 251 N.E.2d 265 [6 UCC REP. StaV.
1185] (1969).
216. New Jersey had held in a pre-Code transaction that a landlord's lien had priority
over a subsequently perfected non-purchase money chattel mortgage on equipment of a
lessee. Gibraltar Factors Corp. v. Slapo, 23 N.J. 459, 129 A.2d 567 (1957). A somewhat
similar view has been expressed by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in a case involving
South Carolina law. Brunswick Corp. v. Long, 392 F.2d 337 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 391
U.S. 966 (1968). Under Texas pre-Code law, it would appear that a properly perfected
chattel mortgage would have priority over a subsequent landlord's lien. Stone v. Mainland
Bank & Trust Co., 324 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1959). In Alabama, in a somewhat
converse vein, if the chattel mortgage was not recorded, and the landlord did not have actual
or constructive notice of the mortgage's existence, the landlord's lien would have priority
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In Florida a statute provides that the landlord has a lien upon all prop-
erty usually kept on the premises by the lessee; "[t]his lien shall be
superior to any lien acquired subsequent to the bringing of the property
on the premises leased. 21 7 In addition, the landlord's lien extends to all
other property of the defendant and this lien dates from the levy of the
distress warrant. In two recent cases21 the Third and Fourth District
Courts of Appeal of Florida held that the landlord's lien attaches either
at the time of the commencement of the tenancy or when a chattel is
brought on the premises and that the landlord's lien would have priority
over chattel mortgages which were subsequently perfected upon the
tenant's goods located within the leased premises. A similar view has
been followed in the District of Columbia in a pre-Code case involving a
"deed of trust" (chattel mortgage) imposed upon the tenant's goods
after the commencement of the tenancy. 219 Unfortunately, neither Florida
appellate court made any reference to the UCC even though at least
one 220 of the cases would seem to be within its provisions. In accordance
with the terms of the Florida statute it would appear that a purchase
money security interest which was properly perfected prior to the "bring-
ing of the property on the premises leased" would have priority over the
landlord's lien. However, a more difficult question persists: does the
holder of a purchase money security interest in inventory (or any other
goods sold to a tenant) have the grace period of ten days after possession
of the goods is given to the tenant to perfect as against the landlord in
accordance with Sections 9-301 and 9-312? Under the literal wording of
the Florida statute and the foregoing UCC Sections it would be logical
to argue that if, for example, a purchase money security interest were
perfected by filing on May 8th for goods purchased on April 30th but
delivered to the leased premises on May 1, the UCC interest would have
priority over the landlord's lien. In other words, the "relation-back"
principle of Sections 9-301 and 9-312 might be used in such a way that
the filing may occur subsequent to the bringing of the goods on the
premises to relate back to a date prior to the bringing of the goods on
the leased premises. On the other hand as indicated at the beginning of
this section, it can also be argued that Article 9 has not bearing on any
aspect of the landlord's lien. Therefore, it is suggested that until a defin-
itive decision has been rendered by the Supreme Court of Florida it might
over the chattel mortgage. East Gadsden Bank v. Bagwell, 278 Ala. 430, 178 So.2d 823
(1965). See also Electric Constr., Inc. v. Azar, 405 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1968) construing
Alabama law. The pre-Code law of Delaware semed to give the landlord's lien priority over
a properly perfected chattel mortgage, but if the mortgagee was the United States, then since
the lien is inchoate, the United States had priority. Stein v. Moat, 297 F. Supp. 708 (D. Del.
1969).
217. FLA. STAT. § 83.08 (1969).
218. Geiger Mut. Agen., Inc. v. Wright, 233 So.2d 444 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970); G.M.C.A.
Corp. v. Noni, Inc., 227 So.2d 891 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
219. The Elmira Corp. v. BulIman, 135 A.2d 645 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1957).
.220. Geiger Mut. Agency, Inc. v. Wright, 233 So.2d 444 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
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be wise for inventory suppliers and lenders to seek to obtain waivers of
lien from landlords.
221
G. Mechanic's Lien Claimant Versus Inventory Lender (9-310)
Although it may not be extremely common, it is possible for a
mechanic (or other artisan) to furnish service or materials to inventory
goods and to put himself in a position of contention with the holder of a
security interest in this inventory. Section 9-310 provides that when the
artisan furnishes these services or materials in the ordinary course of his
business "a lien upon goods in the possession of such person given by
statute or rule of law for such materials or services takes priority over
a perfected security interest unless the lien is statutory and the statute
expressly provides otherwise." This Code provision has the effect of local-
izing any dispute between inventory lender and mechanic's lien claimant
by requiring observance of state mechanics' lien statutes.
Kentucky,22 Tennessee,22  Florida, 24 Pennsylvania,2 5 Michigan,226
and formerly Illinois 227 have held in non-inventory cases that the me-
chanic in possession of a car has priority over the holder of a prior
perfected security interest in the car. On the other hand, Arkansas, -228
Ohio,229 Alaska,2 30 Iowa,231 and now Illinois 232 hold that the holder of the
security interest has priority because their respective mechanics' lien
statutes expressly provide for subordinate status of these liens or other-
wise condition the obtaining of priority. Colorado has substituted the
phrase "does not take priority" instead of the words "takes priority"
and it would appear that the artisan will step in line behind the prior
security interest holder.3 8
In Virginia the mechanic is granted a lien for repairs and a garage-
221. See Borochoff Prop., Inc. v. Howard Lumber Co., 115 Ga. App. 651, 155 S.E.2d
651 [4 UCC REP. SERV. 229] (1967) for a passing reference to this notion of waiver.
222. Corbin Deposit Bank v. King, 384 S.W.2d 302 [2 UCC REP. SFav. 441] (Ky. Ct.
App. 1964).
223. Forrest Cate Ford v. Fryar, - Tenn. App. -, 465 S.W.2d 882 [8 UCC REP. SERV.
239] (1971).
224. Gables Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. First Bank & Trust Co., 219 So.2d 90 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1969).
225. First Nat'l Bank v. Vargo Motor Co., 43 Pa. D. & C.2d 698 [5 UCC REP. SEnv.
252] (Pa. Ct. C.P., Cambria County 1966).
226. Nickell v. Lambrecht, 29 Mich. App. 191, 185 N.W.2d 155 [8 UCC REP. Smv.
1381] (1971).
227. Westlake Fin. Co. v. Spearmon, 64 Ill. App. 2d 342, 213 N.E.2d 80 [2 UCC REP.
SERv. 1174] (1965).
228. Bond v. Dudley, 244 Ark. 568, 426 S.W.2d 780 [5 UCC REP. SERV. 249] (1968).
229. Commonwealth Loan Co. v. Berry, 2 Ohio St. 2d 169, 31 Ohio Op. 2d 321, 207
N.E.2d 545 [2 UCC REP. SERV. 749] (1965).
230. Decker v. Aurora Motors, Inc., 409 P.2d 603 [3 UCC REP. SERV. 69] (Alaska 1966).
231. Municipal Equip. Co. v. Butch & Son Deep Rock, - Iowa -, 185 N.W.2d 756
[8 UCC REP. SERV. 1368] (1971).
232. See note 227 supra.
233. See First Security Bank v. Crouse, 374 F.2d 17 [4 UCC REP. Smy. 120] (10th Cir.
1967) (dicta).
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man is granted a lien for storage; the mechanic has priority over a prior
perfected security interest in a car in an amount not exceeding $75.00
and has subordinate status for anything in excess of this amount. The
garageman's lien is subordinate in all respects to the prior perfected
security interest.8 4
A recent Tennessee case has presented an interesting interpretation
of Section 9-310 of the Code. 35 In Tennessee the mechanic has a common
law possessory lien which is lost upon relinquishment of possession of
the property and a statutory lien which is not dependent upon possession.
The Tennessee court held that when a mechanic surrendered four re-
paired trucks to their owner and these trucks were subject to perfected
security interests, the mechanic lost any priority which he would have
had under a combination of the common law possessory lien and Section
9-310 because Section 9-310 states that the mechanic's lien is limited to
those liens upon "goods in the possession of" the artisan or repairman.
It is somewhat fascinating to note that a statute which was obviously
designed to give the mechanic something he did not have under the com-
mon law, i.e., a non-possessory lien, has the result when combined with
Section 9-3 10 of taking something from him.
H. Surety Versus Inventory Lender
It is a common legal requirement in most states that construction
contracts entered into between the state and general contractors for
construction work provide a surety bond guaranteeing performance of
the contract. Similar patterns are today often found in non-governmental
building contracts. Usually the surety contract will provide that the gen-
eral contractor assigns all of his construction contract rights (with the
owner, governmental or non-governmental) to the surety company and
this assignment will be activated in the event that the contractor defaults
and the surety is forced to defray the cost of completion. It is also com-
mon for contractors to give banks and other lenders security interests in
the contractor's inventory, accounts and contract rights, and these lenders
will file financing statements to perfect their interests. In the event of a
default and completion of the work by the surety company, who will
have priority as to any funds owing as a result of the completion of the
work-the lender who has perfected by filing or the surety company
which has not filed a financing statement? In spite of the views advocated
in several law review articles and notes,23 the general view is that the
234. Checker Flag Motor Car Co., Inc. v. Grulke, 209 Va. 427, 164 S.E.2d 660 [5 UCC
REP. SERv. 1199] (1968).
235. Forrest Cate Ford v. Fryar, - Tenn. App. -, 465 S.W.2d 882, [8 UCC REP.
SERv. 239] (1971).
236. Note, 65 CoLum. L. REv., 927 (1965); Note, 69 Dicx. L. REv. 172 (1965); Com-
ment, 6 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 798 (1965); See generally Cushman, The Surety's Right of
Equitable,. Priority to Contract Balances in Relation to the Uniform Commercial Code, 29
Too. L.Q. 239 (1966).
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surety has priority over the holder of a security interest in the contrac-
tor's accounts or contract rights who has properly filed his financing
statement.
The consensus seems to be that since Article 9 "applies to security
interests created by contract" while the surety's rights grow out of law-
created rights of subrogation (even though the contract of suretyship
might specify a contractual assignment), Article 9 should not apply to
the surety because its subrogation rights are not security interests. In
brief, the surety has protection without any filing.
237
It should also be mentioned (as noted by one court) 28 that it was
proposed to add a Subsection 7 to Section 9-312 which would have pro-
vided that: "A security interest which secures an obligation to reimburse
a surety . . . secondarily obligated to complete performance is subor-
dinate to" a subsequent lender who perfects its security interest. The
official comments note that this proposed addition would have completely
reversed the pre-Code case law in a majority of the states if it had been
adopted. This historical background would seem to be a clear rejection
of any notion that the surety's rights were to be dependent upon any
compliance with Article 9.
It should also be noted that some states prohibit any assignment of
an account when its source happens to be a contract with a state or county
government, 239 while federal law, on the other hand, requires that as-
signments of claims against the United States be filed in a particular
manner.2
40
I. Ad Valorem Taxing Authority Versus Inventory Lender
Some states (Florida, for example) 241 provide that all tangible per-
sonal property in the possession of the taxpayer as of January 1 of each
year is subject to a tax lien assessment even though the amount of the
assessment (including both the millage rate as well as the assessed
237. Framingham Trust Co. v. Gould-National Batteries, Inc., 427 F.2d 856 [8 UCC
REP. SERV. 228] (1st Cir. 1970); National Shawmut Bank v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., Inc.,
411 F.2d 843 [6 UCC REP. SERV. 441, 6 UCC REP. SERV. 596] (1st Cir. 1969); Home Indem.
Co. v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 173, 376 F.2d 890 [8 UCC REP. SERV. 225] (1967) ; Canter v.
Schlager, - Mass. -. , 267 N.E.2d 492 [8 UCC REP. SERV. 932] (1971); Jacobs v. North-
eastern Corp., 416 Pa. 417, 206 A.2d 49 [2 UCC REP. SERV. 3481 (1965); In re Aetna Cas.
Sur. Co., New York Law Journal, Feb. 5, 1970, at 16 [7 UCC REP. SERv. 358] (N.Y. Sup.
Ct., New York County 1970). The Jacobs case would seem to vitiate the cases of United
States v. G.P. Fleetwood & Co., Inc., 165 F. Supp. 723 [1 UCC REP. SERV. 405] (W.D. Pa.
1958) and Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. State Public School Building Authority, 26
Pa. D. & C.2d 717, 76 Dauphin Co. Rep. 296 [1 UCC REP. SERV. 409] (Ct. C.P., Dauphin
County 1961).
238. National Shawmut Bank v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., Inc., 411 F.2d 843 [6 UCC
REP. SERv. 441] (1st Cir. 1969).
239. E.g., In re Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., New York Law Journal, Feb. 5, 1970, at 16 [7
UCC REP. SERv. 358] (N.Y. Sup. Ct., New York County 1970).
240. 1 G. GnMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONA. PROPERTY § 7.7 (1965), and U.C.C.
§ 9-318, Comment 5.
"241; FLA. STAT. § 197.015 (1969).
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value) will not be known until the latter part of that year. The statutes
may also provide that this lien on inventory will be superior to all other
liens, including security interests. These tax lien statutes will not neces-
sarily work an injustice to a lender holding a security interest in col-
lateral such as equipment or fixtures which remain relatively constant in
quantity and quality except for normal depreciation. However, difficulties
are presented when inventory is considered. For example, assume that a
lender has a purchase money security interest in all of the television sets
constituting the inventory of a retail television dealer. On January 1,
the dealer has 100 sets on his floor and in the storeroom and the tax lien
assessment is based on the market value of these 100 sets. The dealer
fails to pay his tax on this inventory and in the following year the tax
collector attaches all the inventory then in the retail store and conducts a
sale to satisfy the tax lien. Unfortunately for all concerned, the dealer
has only ten sets in his possession at the time of the tax attachment and
the amount of the tax on 100 sets is equal to or in excess of the value of
the ten sets levied upon. As a result, the purchaser at the sale obtains a
title free of the security interest while the holder of the purchase money
security interest receives nothing. 42 In effect, the taxing authorities are
not obligated to apportion the tax with regard to the available property
(i.e., in the assumed hypothetical ten percent of the tax could be assessed
and collected from the ten percent remaining inventory). Apportionment
would result in the taxing authorities and the secured lender each re-
ceiving ten cents on the dollar while under the present system the taxing
authorities take everything and the lender receives nothing.
It may be asserted that this tax lien problem may be solved by the
lender's policing of the debtor; however, it would seem to require a cer-
tain degree of clairvoyance for the lender to be able to predict what the
millage rate will be when it is not established until months after the
accrual of the lien on the first of the year. Some protection might be
afforded by the security agreement requiring that a certain percentage of
loan proceeds be placed in escrow in order to defray the payment of
taxes, but this would require policing the debtor and result in increased
overhead costs to the lender which will be passed on to the debtor.
J. Inventory Lender's Tort Liability for Wrongful Interference
with Buyer's Rights
Section 2-722 of the Code attempts to articulate the "real party in
interest" concept by stating that when a third party causes injury to
goods which have been identified to a contract for sale, either party to
the sales contract has a right of action against the tort feasor provided
that party has title to, a security interest in, a special property right
in, or an insurable interest in the goods. An unusual application of this
242. Coin Mach. Acceptance Corp. v. Morgenstern, 232 So.2d 423 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
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concept arose in a relatively recent case.248 A farmer entered into a con-
tract with a farm equipment dealer to purchase a tractor; the tractor
was not in stock and the contract provided for certain "extras" to be
added to the tractor when it arrived from the manufacturer. The tractor
was delivered to the dealer subject to a trust receipt security interest held
by the manufacturer; the security interest permitted the dealer to sell
the tractor. The farmer visited the dealer and the dealer pointed out the
tractor to the farmer and said it was his; unfortunately, the extras were
not available. The farmer never paid any part of the purchase price, and
the manufacturer repossessed this tractor (and others) when the dealer
defaulted in making payments pursuant to the trust receipts security
agreement. The farmer attempted to negotiate directly with the manufac-
turer, but the negotiations were not successful. The farmer had to farm
with his old tractor (which was to have been the trade-in tractor) and
suffered a monetary loss in his farming operations as a result of not
having the new tractor. The farmer then sued the manufacturer and the
court held that the tractor had been "identified" to the contract (under
Section 2-501); that the intent of the trust receipt security agreement
was for the dealer to sell the tractor free and clear of the security interest
of the defendant-manufacturer and the security interest would not be a
bar to this suit by the farmer against the manufacturer.
It would seem that if the rationale of this case should gain accep-
tance, it would behoove inventory financiers to carry out the contracts of
their defaulting dealers; the loss of profits ($396.70 in this case) might
not be much from a small farmer but they might be tremendous in the
case involving a large passenger aircraft, a large dragline, etc.
243. Draper v. Minneapolis-Moline, Inc., 100 Ill. App. 2d 324, 241 N.E.2d 342 [5 UCC
REP. SERv. 972] (1968).
1971]
